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Line Drawing, Doctrine, and
Efficiency in the Tax Law
David A. Weisbach*
Doctrinal tax disputes are notoriously messy. Non-tax scholars
stay out of the room when the tax geeks start talking doctrine. And
tax academics generally do not write serious articles about doctrinal
issues. For example, since Professor Plumb summarized the case law
on the difference between debt and equity,1 nobody has touched the
subject. There are few substantial articles about the definition of
capital gains2 and none on the difference between independent
contractors and employees. Literally dozens of subjects within the
tax law are viewed as outside the scope of serious academic discourse.
Yet on a daily basis, policymakers in the Treasury, Congress and the
courts make decisions on these matters.
Doctrinal disputes in disparate areas of the tax law, in fact, have
the same underlying structure: Doctrine is used to draw lines
between otherwise similar activities. For example, doctrinal rules
determine which of similar financing devices are treated as debt and
which are treated as equity, or which of similar service contracts
create employment as opposed to independent contractor
relationships. Viewed from this perspective, doctrinal rules in
* Associate Professor, University of Chicago Law School. I thank David
Bradford, Patrick Crawford, Avery Katz, Heidi Feldman, Dan Shaviro, Lynn
Stout, and Steve Salop and participants in the Georgetown University Law
Center faculty retreat and the NYU Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public
Finance for comments.
1 William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate
Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 369, 530 (1971).
2 See Cunningham & Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Preference, 48
TAX L. REV. 319 (1993), and George Zodrow, Economic Analysis of Capital
Gains Taxation: Realizations, Revenues, Efficiency, and Equity, 48 T AX . L. REV.
419 (1993) for arguments on whether there should be a capital gains preference,
given the definition of a capital gain. There are few, if any, articles discussing
the appropriate definition of a capital gain. For one of the few recent examples,
see Calvin Johnson, Seventeen Culls from Capital Gains, 48 TAX N OTES, 1285
(1990). See also, Stanley Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains
Taxation, 69 HARV . L. REV. 985 (1956).
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disparate areas of the tax law can be analyzed as a single class of
problems, line drawing problems, and are susceptible to solutions
with a common structure.
The thesis of this paper is that line drawing in the tax law can
and should be based on the efficiency of the competing rules.3
Doctrinal concerns, such as whether various legal constructs can be
fit together, or traditional tax policy concerns, such as whether
something is “income” within the Haig-Simons definition,4 are
neither helpful nor relevant to most disputes.5
3

See discussion infra part II II.A.1. for a definition of efficiency as used

here.
4 Under the Haig-Simons definition of income, a taxpayer has income i n
each period equal to her consumption plus her change in savings. See HENRY
C. SIMONS , PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION (1938); Robert M. Haig, The
Concept of Income–Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME T AX,
1, 7 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921), reprinted in READINGS IN THE E CONOMICS
OF TAXATION 54 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl Shoup eds., 1959).
5 Scholars have previously criticized Haig-Simons income or similar
definitions, as inappropriate criteria for resolving tax issues. Professor Boris
Bittker made this argument more than 30 years ago in his seminal article,
Boris Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80
HARV . L. REV. 925 (1967).
Scholars have made this argument more recently as well. See, e.g., Louis
Kaplow, The Income Tax as Insurance: The Casualty Loss and Medical Expense
Deductions and the Exclusion of Medical Insurance Premiums, 79 C AL . L. REV.
1485 (1991); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate
Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 C AL . L. REV. 1905 (1987);
Louis Kaplow, A Fundamental Objection to Equity Norms: A Call for
Utilitarianism, 48 NATIONAL T AX J. 497 (199_); Thomas D. Griffith, Should
“Tax Norms” be Abandoned? Rethinking Tax Policy Analysis and the Taxation of
Personal Injury Recoveries, 1993 W ISC . L. REV. 1116; Thomas D. Griffith,
Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 H ASTINGS L. J. 343
(1989); Joseph E. Stiglitz & Michael J. Boskin, Impact of Recent Developments
in Public Finance on Public Policy Decisions: Some Lessons from the New Public
Finance, 67 AM . ECON. REV. 295 (1977); Louis Kaplow, How Tax Complexity
and Enforcement Affect the Equity and Efficiency of the Income Tax, 49 NATIONAL
TAX J. 135 (1996). Instead, they argue scholars should rely on explicitly stated
notions of distributive justice.
This paper is consistent with and is based on these works. It adds to these
works by focusing on a particular policymaking context, line drawing, and
suggesting that line drawing problems have a common structure susceptible to a
common solution. The work that is closest to the approach taken here is Daniel
N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules under the
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The underlying structure of the problem is as old as the classical
Greek paradox of Sorites. If the removal of one grain of sand from a
heap still leaves a heap, the paradox goes, so too with the removal of
the next grain, and the next, and the one after that. It follows that
the removal of all of the grains still leaves a heap. We know,
however, that heaps and empty spaces are different, and the
challenge is to come up with a justifiable demarcation.6 We may
know that debt and equity are different, capital gains and ordinary
income are different, and independent contractors and employees are
different, but justifiable demarcations are elusive.
The Greek paradox is about the limits of language, limits that
find their way into the tax law (and all other laws). The difference
between the pile of sand and lines in the tax law is that there are
consequences to the lines in the tax law. That is, in the tax law, the
demarcation, the line between essentially identical items, has effects
on welfare, particularly the efficiency of the tax system, and the line
should be drawn in a way that maximizes welfare.7
The approach recommended here is best illustrated by an
example, the so-called “check-the-box” regulations.8 Prior to the
check-the-box regulations, the determination of whether an entity
was treated as a corporation, subject to the double tax, or a
Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 1 (1992). Shaviro argues that the
realization doctrine can be analyzed from an efficiency perspective.
6 See Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV . L. REV. 361, 379
(1985) for a discussion of the Sorites problem.
7 This, of course, does not mean that the Sorites paradox is solved. The
point of the paradox about the limits of language remains correct. Any line we
draw will still suffer from the basic problem, but given the limits of language,
lines should be drawn as efficiently as possible. For example, we could specify
the number of grains of sand and how close together they must be to be called a
heap. The specification would still be ambiguous because it uses language, but
the specification may make the line between a heap and everything else more
efficient (for whatever purpose we are making the distinction).
H.L.A. Hart referred to this problem as the “open-texture” of rules. A s
Hart stated, “Particular fact situations do not await us already marked off from
each other, and labeled as instances of the general rule, the application of which
is in question; nor can the rule itself step forward to claim its own instances.
In all fields of experience, not only that of rules, there is a limit, inherent i n
the nature of language, to the guidance which general language can provide.”
H.L.A. HART , THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126 (2d ed 1994).
8 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2 and -3.
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partnership, subject to only a single tax, was based on four factors
that described platonic notions of partnerships and corporations. For
example, corporations were thought to have centralized
management, but partnerships were not. Corporations were thought
to have unlimited life, but partnerships were not. Business entities
with a sufficient number of corporate factors were subject to the
corporate tax because they were closer to the platonic notion of a
corporation than to the notion of a partnership. In addition, entities
with traded equity interests (e.g., stock listed on an exchange),9 and
entities that were actually incorporated under a state law
incorporation statute10 were automatically treated as corporations.
Taxpayers could manipulate the four factors at will—structures
were readily available that gave taxpayers the economics of the four
factors without being treated as such by the tax law.11 Typically,
9

The publicly traded restriction is found in I.R.C. § 7704 . The publicly
traded rule was enacted in 1986 in response to the growth of publicly traded
partnerships, which, despite the four factor test, were viewed as effective
substitutes for corporations. Prior to enactment of the publicly traded test, the
distinction between corporations and partnerships was based solely on the four
factor test.
10 The statute, I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3), defines corporation to include
associations. The understanding based on this statute is that associations are
business entities that are not traditional state law corporations or partnerships.
A state law corporation, defined by an actual incorporation, is automatically a
corporation for tax purposes. The four factor test was primarily designed to
distinguish business associations from partnerships.
11 If for business reasons, the company had to be actually incorporated or
had to have traded equity, then it could not generally avoid corporate status.
That is, the real lines under the four factor test were public trading and actual
incorporation. See JOINT C OMMITTEE ON TAXATION , 105 CONG . 1ST S ESS .,
REVIEW OF SELECTED ENTITY C LASSIFICATION AND PARTNERSHIP TAX
ISSUES 15 (Comm. Print April 8, 1997) (“it could be asserted that, in actual
practice, the [four factor test] had come to be so readily manipulated by tax
practitioners as to be effectively elective, so that the adoption of an affirmatively
elective regime is a change in form rather than in substance from the former
regulations.”)
The most important structure used to manipulate the four factor test was
the limited liability company (LLC), which was invented in the 1980's. LLC’s
had most of the economic advantages of corporations, including limited liability
for all members, but were treated as partnerships for tax purposes. See, e.g.,
Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988- 2 C.B. 360 (holding that a Wyoming LLC is a
partnership for tax purposes). The reason taxpayers could achieve these results
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taxpayers would set up their organizations to be classified as
partnerships rather than corporations because of the lower tax on
partnerships. Although taxpayers could achieve their desired tax
results, the costs (for example, the changes in organizational
structures needed to meet the rules and the fees to accountants and
lawyers) were significant in the aggregate.
The check-the-box regulations eliminate the four factor test and
move the line between partnerships and corporations to public
trading. On a rough basis, an entity is treated as a corporation if its
stock is traded. Otherwise it is treated as a partnership, unless it
makes an affirmative election to be treated as a corporation, hence
the name “check-the-box”.12
The argument for abandoning the four factor test is that it
merely caused people to shift their organizational structures without
collecting any tax. Little tax was collected at great cost. It was
enormously inefficient. The check-the-box regulations instead tried
to draw a line, public trading, that was more difficult to avoid.13 It
was thought that because fewer taxpayers would change their
behavior to avoid the new line, it was more efficient. Even if the
check-the-box regulations lose revenue (and they inevitably will lose
was that the four factors were easily manipulable. For example, continuity of
life was present unless the death, insanity bankruptcy, removal, or withdrawal
of any member of the organization caused the organization’s dissolution. But
the members could agree to refrain for causing a dissolution if one of these
events occur, which meant the business entity could effectively continue but not
be treated as having continuity of life for tax purposes. See Treas. Reg.
§301.7701-2(b)(2) (as in effect in 1995).
12 The only major deviation from this scheme is that the check-the-box
regulations retain the rule that state law corporations are automatically traded as
corporations. This rule is commonly viewed as an anomaly in the check-thebox world and is thought to have been retained solely because of concerns about
the Treasury Department’s authority to change this rule by regulation. See
sources cited infra note 15. The other departure from this rule in the
international context where the Treasury listed a number of “per se”
corporations. See Treas. Reg. §1.7701-2(a)(8). Generally these are entities that
could not readily be treated as a partnership under the four factor test because of
restrictions on the capital structure imposed by foreign law.
13 The analysis here ignores the elective element of the check-the-box
regulations on the assumption that virtually everyone will choose the
partnership structure. Section III below, which applies the efficiency analysis
recommended here to a debt, equity problem, considers the effect of electivity.
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some), the prior system was such a bad source of revenue that
replacing the lost revenue with a better tax should be easy.
Regardless of whether this argument was correct (a subject that
will be explored much more below14), what is important about the
check-the-box regulations is that it dropped traditional doctrinal
concerns and instead focused on efficiency. This is a dramatically
new, and correct, approach to line drawing.15
14 See discussion infra part II.A.4. There is some indication, however,
that the check-the-box regulations lose more money for the government that
might have been thought. For example, the check-the-box regulations are a
major factor behind recent moves by the Treasury to prevent taxpayers from
using so-called hybrid entities. See Notice 98-11, 1998-6 IRB 18; Treas Reg.
§1.904-5T; Notice 98-35, 1998-__ IRB _. A hybrid entity is treated as a
corporation for foreign law purposes but uses the check-the-box rules to elect
partnership treatment for U.S. purposes. There are many advantages of using
hybrid entities. Notice 98-11 and the accompanying regulations were designed
to prevent the use of hybrid entities to avoid the anti-deferral provisions of
Subpart F.
15 The check-the-box regulations have produced an outpouring of
commentary, although little if any focuses on the efficiency considerations
underlying the decision to promulgate the regulations. For a sampling of the
commentary on the check-the-box regulations, see Richard A. Booth, The
Limited Liability Company and the Search for a Bright Line Between Corporations
and Partnerships, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 79 (1997); Victor E. Fleischer, “If
It Looks Like a Duck”: Corporate Resemblance and Check the Box Elective Tax
Classification, 96 C OLUMBIA L. REV. 518 (1996); Jerold A. Friedland, Tax
Considerations in Selecting a Business Entity: the New Entity Classification Rules, 9
DE PAUL B US . L.J. 109 (1996); Christopher H. Hanna, Initial Thoughts on
Classifying the Major Japanese Business Entities Under the Check the Box
Regulations, 51 S.M.U. L. REV . 99 (1997); Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Elective Tax
Classification for Qualifying Foreign and Domestic Business Entities Under the Final
Check the Box Regulations, 51 S.M.U. L. REV. 99 (1997); George K. Yin, The
Taxation of Private Business Enterprises: Some Policy Questions Stimulated by the
Check the Box Regulations, 51 S.M.U. L. REV. 125 (1997); Thomas M. Hayes,
NOTE: Checkmate, the Treasury Finally Surrenders: The Check the Box Treasury
Regulations and Their Effect on Entity Classification, 54 W ASH . & LEE L. REV.
1147 (1997); Susan Pace Hamill & F. Hodge O’Neal, Corporate and Securities
Law Symposium: Limited Liability Companies and Limited Partnerships: A Case
for Eliminating the Partnership Classification Regulations, 73 W ASH . U. L. Q.
565 (1995); John M. Magee, Scott F. Farmer, & Robert A. Katcher,
Reexamining Branch Rules in the Context of Check the Box, 77 TAX NOTES
1511, (December 29, 1997); Scott D. Smith, What are States Doing on Checkthe-Box Regs?, 76 TAX N OTES 973, (August 18, 1997); Joni L. Walser &
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The example is easily generalized. Tax policy decisions typically
require drawing a line between two relatively fixed points, such as
the line in the check-the-box regulations between partnerships and
corporations. Between the fixed points is a continuous range of
transactions. Wherever the line is drawn, transactions on either side
of the line will be substantially identical, in the sense that they are
substitutes for one another, and taxpayers will change their behavior
to take advantage of the line. The tax-induced change in behavior
will have efficiency effects. This is true regardless of how arbitrary
the line is or how doctrinally complex the subject matter. The thesis
of this paper is that given a constraint that a tax distinction between
similar activities must be made, the line should be drawn to be as
efficient as possible.16
Robert E. Culberston, Encore une Fois: Check-the-Box on the International Stage,
76 TAX N OTES 403, (July 21, 1997); Hugh M. Dougan, Lori S. Hoberman,
& John W. Harper, Check-the-Box -- Looking Under the Lid, 75 TAX NOTES
1141 (May 26, 1997); Reuven Avi-Yonah, To End Deferral as We Know It:
Simplification Potential of Check-the-Box, 74 TAX NOTES 219 (January 13,
1997); Daniel Shefter, Check The Box Partnership Classification: A Legitimate
Exercise in Tax Simplification, 67 TAX N OTES 279 (April 10, 1995); Richard
M. Lipton & John T. Thomas, Impact of Final Check-the-Box Regulations
Awaits Further IRS Guidance and States’ Input, 14 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX’N 91
(Summer 1997); Payson R. Peabody, States Generally Endorse Check-the-Box
but Key Issues Remain, 87 J. Tax’n 228 (October 1997); Roger F. Pillow, John
G. Schmalz, & Samuel P. Starr, Simplified Entity Classification Under the Final
Check-the-Box Regulations, 86 J. TAX’N 197 (April 1997); Marc M. Levey, &
Richard D. Teigen, International Implications of Check-the-Box, 85 J. TAX’N 261
(November 1996); Roger F. Pillow, John G. Schmalz, & Samuel P. Starr,
Check-the-Box Proposed Regs. Simplify the Entity Classification Process, 85 J.
TAX’N 72 (August 1996); Craig W. Friedrich, The Impact of the Final Checkthe-Box Entity Classification Regulations on Real Estate, 24 J. R EAL ESTATE
TAX’N 331 (1997); Michael Hirschfeld & Jo-Renee Hunter, Check-the-Box
Regs. Require Planning to Avoid Default Status, 7 J. INT’L TAX’N 292 (July
1996); Craig W. Friedrich, One Step Forward--Final Check-the-Box Entity
Classification Regulations Issued, 24 J. CORP . TAX’N 107 (1997); Francis J.
Wirtz, Check-the-Box: The Proposed Regulations on Entity Classification, 74
TAXES 255 (June 1996); Ann F. Thomas, Square Wheels: U.S. Pass-Through
Taxation of Privately Held Enterprises in a Comparative Law Context, 17 N. Y.
L. SC H .. J. INT ’L & COMP . L. 429 (1997).
16 The most important caveat to the thesis is that we must be willing to
adjust the tax rates to achieve the appropriate distributional consequences. That
is, the approach taken here is a consequentialist approach and distributional
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Section I of the paper begins by showing that the line drawing
problem is pervasive in the tax law and gives several examples of line
drawing in the tax law that are used throughout the paper. It then
shows how traditional theory fails to address the problem. Section II
shows how line drawing decisions effect the efficiency of the tax
system, develops some intuitions for drawing lines more efficiently,
and argues that this is the appropriate criterion for line drawing.
Section III gives some examples of the efficiency analysis applied to
line drawing problems and Section IV provides a conclusion.
I. Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Traditional Tax Theory
A. Line Drawing in the Tax Law
The tax law often treats similar activities differently. Selling an
asset is treated differently than holding an asset.17 Debt is treated
differently than equity.18 Independent contractors are treated
differently than employees.19 The basic approach of the tax law is to
classify activities through doctrinal rules and distinctions and tax

concerns matter. The argument made in Section II, however, is that
distributional concerns are best dealt with through the rate structure.
The argument does not implicate whether the lines should be drawn
through rules or standards or whether lines should be simpler than current
law, both of which might be lessons from the check-the-box regulations.
Moreover, the argument is not that all decisions in the tax law should be made
solely by reference to efficiency. Instead, the argument is that the boundaries of
the classifications within the tax law should be set efficiently.
17 See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) and I.R.C. § 1001.
18 See Plumb, supra note 1, for a description of the differences. The most
important difference is that the return on a debt instrument is treated as
interest, deductible to the borrower and taxable to the lender while the return
on equity is treated as dividends or capital gain, taxable to the investor but not
deductible to the business.
19 For example, employees are subject to wage withholding but
independent contractors are not. See I.R.C. §§ 3401-04. The distinction
between independent contractors and employees has been extremely
controversial. See Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 (identifying 20 factors
relevant to the employee/independent contractor distinction); Mason,
Independent Contractor or Employee: The Continuing Controversy, 75 TAXES 99
(1997).
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them according a pattern for the classification.20 The daily gruel of
the tax lawyer is to explain and manipulate these classifications, and,
although current classifications are frighteningly more complex than
those of earlier law, the role of tax lawyers and tax doctrine has not
changed since the creation of the income tax.
The basic structure of these classifications is that there are several
known, or fixed points and a continuous range of transactions that
fall between them. For example, we know that certain instruments
are debt and others are equity, and there is a vast range of
instruments between these two poles. We know certain service
contracts create employee relationships and others create
independent contractor relationships, and there are a large number
of intermediate cases. Difficult policy decisions, such as whether an
instrument is debt or equity or whether a service contract creates an
employee relationship, typically involve transactions in this middle
range.
To be sure, many of the “fixed points” can, and potentially
should, change. For example, we could eliminate the distinction
between debt and equity rather than navigate between these poles.
We could treat independent contractors and employees the same.
The goal of tax reformers for decades has been to identify and
eliminate unsupported doctrinal classifications. Taxing similar
activities differently causes behavioral distortions and unfairness, and
the complex doctrines needed to draw these distinctions make
compliance costly. Reformers argue, therefore, that a broad tax base,
one that taxes all forms of income equally, is the fairest, most
efficient, and most easily administered tax base.21
20 One author has referred to the line drawing approach of tax law as the
cubbyhole approach. The tax law classifies activities by putting them into
various cubbyholes and taxing them according to the rules for the cubbyhole.
Edward D. Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Products: Financial Innovation’s Newest
Challenge to the Tax System, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1319, 1320 (1991).
21 Entire volumes of tax policy research have been devoted to this. See e.g.,
COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION (Joseph Pechman, ed. 1977); A
COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAX BASE , A DEBATE (1968) (a series of articles
originally published in the Harvard Law Review, republished in book form).
Even fundamental tax reform is likely to leave some line drawing
problems. For example, the Hall/Rabushka flat tax proposal treats employees
differently than independent contractors. Employees may not deduct the cost of
business inputs, such as un-reimbursed employee expenses, but independent
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I fully support the goal of a broader, more rational tax base and
the scholarship pursuing it. This paper, however, focuses on a more
pragmatic issue: how should the policy maker respond to the typical,
real life situation of drawing a line between relatively fixed points.
Doctrinal distinctions are often deeply embedded in the tax law and
are not easily eliminated. Many, such as the realization requirement,
are fundamental building blocks of our tax system. Policymakers
need guidance in this second-best context which they encounter on
a daily basis, where change short of fundamental reform is being
considered.22
It will be useful to have several examples to use throughout the
paper. Two of the doctrinal distinctions most central to our tax
system are the realization requirement and the corporate tax, and I
will use these as the running examples. It is worth giving some detail
on these rules up front. Other examples abound, and Appendix A
includes a list of some of the more important doctrinal distinctions
in the tax law.
Realization. Under the realization requirement, income is not
taxed (and losses are not deducted) until the income or loss is
“realized.”23 Although the Code contains no definition, realization
contracts may. Distinguishing between the two will be problematic. ROBERT
E. H ALL & A LVIN R ABUSHKA , L OW T AX , SIMPLE T AX , FLAT T AX 119122 (1983).
The basic problem is the Sorites problem of distinguish a heap from empty
space. Even in cases where there is a principled difference between two items –
a heap is really different than empty space – distinguishing between them may
be difficult.
22 The range of alternatives allowed to be considered by the poliycmaker is
central to any analysis. For example, if integration of the corporate and
individual taxes is an alternative, then we may not need to worry about the
debt/equity distinction or the definition of a corporation (depending on how
integration is achieved). The problem of determining the allowable range of
alternatives is a standard problem in second-best analysis. For example, the
results of the Ramsey analysis, a seminal result in tax policy, change
significantly in the presence of an income tax. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Pareto
Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New New Welfare Economics, in
H ANDBOOK OF PUBLIC E CONOMICS 1027-29 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin
Feldstein, eds. 1985). The allowable range of alternatives will vary with the
problem and over time, and it is worth studying problems with varying ranges
of alternatives.
23 See I.R.C. § 1001.
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generally means the asset producing the income or loss is sold or
exchanged. The realization requirement is a bedrock of the existing
tax system. It was originally thought to be a constitutional
requirement.24 Although no longer a constitutional requirement,
there are only a handful of exceptions to the general rule that
realization is required before a taxpayer must report income.25 While
some scholars have suggested the possibility of eliminating the
realization requirement (at least in part), the likelihood remains
remote.26
The scope of the realization requirement is elusive. There is no
underlying legal or economic concept one can use as a touchstone.
Although we know that some things are treated as sales and some as
holding, there is a vast area that falls between the two. Transactions
in this indeterminate area must be classified as either selling or
holding.
The Supreme Court originally attempted to divide the terrain by
defining realization in terms of a “severance” or “derivation” of gain
from capital, such that it is received or drawn by the recipient.27
Severance, however, proved inadequate. For example, the Court held
that a lessor has a realization event when it reclaims land upon a
24
25

See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
The most important exception is embodied in I.R.C. § 475, which
requires securities dealers to measure portions of their income under the HaigSimons definition. As there is no precise definition of the term “realization,”
there can be no precise count of the deviations from the term. For example, the
requirement to include interest income before it is paid might be viewed as a
deviation from the realization requirement or it might be viewed as simply
determining the time of realization. See I.R.C. § 1272-75. Similarly,
depreciation allowances may be viewed as exceptions to the realization
requirement or not. See Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation -- Tax
Expenditure or Proper Allowance for Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH . L. REV.
1, 12 (1979). Whether something is an exception to the realization requirement
or not, in the end, has little meaning. It is the substantive law itself that has
effects, not views of whether the substantive law is an exception to, or part of, a
general rule.
26 See David Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual
Taxation, 134 U. PENN L. REV. 1111 (1986); Fred B. Brown, “Complete”
Accrual Taxation, 33 SAN D IEGO L. R. 1559 (1996); and David A. Weisbach,
A Partial Mark-to-Market Tax System, forthcoming, TAX L. REV (and sources
cited in note 3 of that article).
27 See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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lease default that includes a building added by the tenant, even
though the building is not severable from the land.28 And lower
courts have ruled that “severing” the cash from an asset by borrowing
against appreciation does not create a realization event.29
An alternative formulation is whether there has legally been a
sale, regardless of the economic consequences. A variety of statutes
recognize that a formal sale is insufficient to create a realization
event, prohibiting, for example, claiming losses from sales to related
parties, from wash sales (selling and immediately repurchasing an
identical asset), or from other similar transactions.30 The Supreme
Court, however, decided, to the surprise of many, that exchanging
economically identical but legally different portfolios of securities was
a realization event.31 The implications of this decision remain
uncertain. For example it is not clear whether, outside of specific
statutory rules, purely legal formalities control or whether economic
substance continues to matter.32 Regulations addressing the impact
of the decision for a single type of transaction are close to 50 pages
long.33
28
29
30

See Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940).
See Woodsam Assocs. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
See e.g., I.R.C. § 267 (prohibiting taxpayers from claiming losses on
sales to related parties), 1091 (prohibiting taxpayers from claiming losses on
certain “wash sales”), and I.R.C. § 1092 (prohibiting taxpayers from claiming
losses in certain cases when there is identifiable, related gain).
31 Cottage Savings Ass’n v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991).
32 The uncertainty has spawned a large body of commentary. See, e.g.,
Loren D. Prescott, Jr., Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner, Refining the
Concept of Realization, 60 FORDHAM L. R. 437 (1991); John E. Capps, In the
Wake of Cottage Savings: The Tax Consequences of Debt Modifications, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 2015 (1994); Scott Lenz, The Symmetry of the Realization Requirement and
Its Application to the “Mortgage Swap” Cases, 9 V A . TAX REV. 359 (1989);
Robert Willens & Andrea J. Phillips, A Road Map Through the Cottage Savings
Regulations, 72 TAX N OTES 765 (August 5, 1996); Richard L. Bacon &
Harold L. Adrion, Taxable Events: The Aftermath of Cottage Savings (Part I), 59
TAX N OTES 1227 (May 31, 1993); Richard L. Bacon & Harold L. Adrion,
Taxable Events: The Aftermath of Cottage Savings (Part II), 59 TAX NOTES
1385 (June 7, 1993); Richard L. Bacon, S&L Loan Swaps at the Supreme Court:
Ripple Effects, 49 TAX N OTES 1121, (December 3, 1990); Richard M. Lipton,
The Section 1001 Debt Modification Regulations: Problems and Opportunities, 85 J.
TAX’N 216 (1996).
33 See Treas. Reg. §1.1001-3.
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If legal formalities are not the appropriate rule, one might
instead focus on the economics of a sale. A taxpayer might, for
example, be treated as holding an asset only if she has the risk of loss
and opportunity for gain from the asset. This is consistent with a
platonic notion of holding and selling. In some circumstances risk
has traditionally been relevant to whether there has been a sale,34 but
implementing this rule on a general basis is a formidable proposition.
For example, hedging transactions, in which taxpayers reduce the
risk of loss on an asset or business operation, have never been
thought to be a realization event.35
A final approach might be to look to the underlying reasons for
the realization requirement. This might be particularly appropriate
for a court or the Treasury Department when interpreting the tax
law.36 The reasons given for the realization requirement are that
taxpayers may not be able to determine value of an asset or may not
have the funds to pay the tax without a sale.37 These reasons are all
but worthless for making policy because they bear no relationship to
current law. For example, traded stock is easily valued and liquid, so
the realization requirement should not apply to traded stock. If the
realization requirement must apply to stock, the reasons for the
realization requirement cannot determine which stock transactions
are realization events. One cannot, for example, decide whether a
hedge of traded stock or borrowing against appreciation in traded
stock should be realization events by reference to liquidity and
valuation because, under these norms, we would not have a
34 See Frank Lyon v. Commissioner, 435 U.S. 561 (1978) (deciding that
the nominal lessor was the owner of property under the facts of the case).
While not strictly addressing realization, the underlying issue in Frank Lyon,
who is the tax owner of property, stems from the realization concept.
35 See Corn Products v. Commissioner 350 U.S. 46 (1955); Arkansas
Best v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988); and Treas. Reg. §1.1221-2, for
the treatment of hedging transactions.
36 See Michael Livingston, Practical Reason, “Purposivism,” and the
Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 51 TAX L. REV. 677 (1996), for a discussion of
statutory interpretation in the tax context.
37 See DAVID BRADFORD, BLUEPRINTS FOR TAX REFORM 73 (Tax
Analysts, 2d ed., 1984). Blueprints adds a third reason, the administrative
burden of annual reporting which seems less important given that annual filing
is already necessary and that the administrative burden of realization taxation is
extremely high.
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realization requirement for stock at all. We cannot look to the
legislative intent or purpose behind the realization doctrine to decide
many of the most basic questions concerning the scope of the
doctrine, not to speak of resolving difficult borderline issues.38
It might be helpful to look at the most recent change to the
realization requirement to get sense of the problem. Prior to this
summer, taxpayers could fully hedge the risk of loss and give up the
opportunity for gain on stock, and still not be treated as having a
realization event. In particular, taxpayers could engage in a
transaction known as a “short-against-the-box,” in which the
taxpayer who owns stock enters into a short sale of the stock, while
technically still holding the original position.39 Future gain or loss on
the short sale exactly offsets future gain or loss on the original stock
position, which means the taxpayer no longer has any economic
stake in the stock. If value of the stock goes up, the short sale goes
down by an exactly equal amount, and if the stock goes down, the
short sale goes up, again by an exactly equal amount. The two
transactions, however were treated as separate transactions, and that
taxpayer did not have to treat the stock as if it were sold.
These transactions looked too much like sales and Congress,
therefore, changed to law to treat them as sales.40 It is not clear,
however, that the change in the law was appropriate. The new law
moves the line between holding and selling incrementally. The
basic, underlying problem, that similar transactions are treated
38

For example, the Supreme Court, in Cottage Savings, the most
significant decision on the scope of the realization doctrine within recent
memory, noted that “neither the language nor the history of the code indicates
whether and to what extent property exchanged must differ to count as a
‘disposition of property’ under §1001(a).” Cottage Savings, 111 S. Ct. at __.
39 In a short sale, the taxpayer borrows stock from a broker and sells the
stock. To close the transaction, the taxpayer buys a share of the same stock on
the market and delivers it to the broker. If he purchases the stock at less than
the amount received from the original sale, the taxpayer makes money, which
means the taxpayer wins if the stock price goes down. If he must purchase it at
more than the amount received from the sale, the taxpayer loses money.
Because the taxpayer makes money if the stock price goes down and loses
money if the stock price goes up, a short sale is a perfect hedge for owning
stock.
40 See I.R.C. § 1259 and CONF . REP . NO . 220, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 512
(1997).
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differently, is still there, only now one must stay one step to the left
of a slightly different line. The law may not be any less avoidable and
is certainly substantially more complex than prior law. It is doubtful
that the legislation moves us any closer to a clear definition of the
realization requirement.41 (Section III briefly discusses whether the
law is appropriate.)
The Corporate Tax. The two-tier corporate tax has been part of
our income tax system since its founding. It imposes a higher rate of
tax on income from investments in corporate stock than on other
investments (in either corporations through a different financial
instrument or in non-corporate businesses). While several recent
studies recommend elimination of the two-tier tax system, there has
never been a strong political push in the United States for doing so.
The two-tier corporate tax is likely to be with us for the indefinite
future.
The distinction between corporations and partnerships addressed
in the check-the-box regulations is an important example of the type
of distinctions drawn by the corporate tax. The other major
distinction defining the corporate tax base is the distinction between
debt and equity. Interest is deductible but dividends are not, so the
distinction between debt and equity creates the double-level
corporate tax.
The distinction between debt and equity may, if possible, be an
even worse morass than the definition of a realization event. The
structure of the problem is the same as the structure of the
realization problem. There are vast numbers of financing devices
that fall between the two simple cases, common stock and fixedrate, secure debt, and no attempt to distinguish between them has
succeeded. The litigated cases are legion, and the court decisions
have been aptly vilified as a “jungle”42 and a “vipers tangle.”43
Like the realization requirement, one cannot look to the
underlying purpose behind the debt/equity distinction to draw the
41

See David A. Weisbach, Should a Short Sale Against the Box be a
Realization Event, 50 N ATIONAL TAX J. 495 (1997), for a summary of
arguments with respect to the new law.
42 Commissioner v. Union Mutual Insurance Co. of Providence, 386
F.2d 974, 978 (1st Cir. 1967).
43 BITTKER &
E USTICE , FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
C ORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶4.04 (6th ed. 1994).
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line. Most scholars believe that there is no justification for the
existence of the two-level corporate tax.44 As Professor Saul Levmore
stated, this means that the distinctions drawn in the corporate tax
are “arbitrary” and “almost necessarily devoid of normative
foundation.”45 Professor (now Dean) Robert Clark argued that the
corporate tax should be understood as the cultural extension of seven
essentially arbitrary assumptions.46 It is difficult, given this lack of
normative content for the corporate tax, to determine the
appropriate debt/equity boundary by reference to the underlying
goals.
We also cannot look to congressional intent to make the
distinction. Section 385 of the Code delegates to the Treasury
Department the authority to make the distinction and no
regulations are (currently) on the books. There is, therefore, little
identifiable congressional intent. Court have been making the
distinction since the beginning of the income tax by looking to the
meaning of the terms “debt” and “equity” rather than any guidance
from Congress on the intended distinction.47
The Treasury Department’s experience with its delegated
authority to draw the line has not been pleasant. Section 385,
delegating authority to the Treasury Department, was enacted in
1969. Proposed regulations were issued 11 years later, in 1980. The
saga which followed is lamentable. The regulations were quickly
finalized but their effective date was twice extended in the face of
criticism. Extensive amendments were proposed in December, 1981,
followed by still further extensions of the effective date. Despite this
work, investment bankers were quickly able to develop an
instrument treated as debt under the regulations, that no court
would have treated as debt under prior law, and that the Treasury
44 That is, there is no justification for imposing a higher tax rate on stock
investments than on other investments.
45 Saul Levmore, Recharacterizations and the Nature of Theory in Corporate
Tax Law, 136 U. PENN. L. REV. 1019 (1988). Levmore includes in this
argument realization rules. For example, he states “there is, in short, no
normative theory or rule that suggests the optimal number or coverage of
recognition rules.” Id. at 1063.
46 Robert C. Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in
Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L .J. 90 (1977).
47 See the cases cited in Plumb, supra note 1.
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Department agreed was not debt.48 With the development of this
instrument, all versions of the regulation were withdrawn (before
they ever took effect) and the project abandoned. Given the lack of
definitive rules and the economic similarity between debt and equity,
designing instruments to skirt the border has become one of the
most active areas of tax planning.49
For example, within the last several years, taxpayers and their
advisors developed a security, known as MIPS,50 that is treated as
debt for tax purposes but is treated as preferred stock for essentially all
other purposes. The details of MIPS are not relevant here.51 The
basic economics are that they are deductible preferred stock—debt
for tax purposes, stock for just about everything else. As they have a
significant tax advantage over preferred stock, they have effectively
replaced preferred stock in the market place.52 The question for the
Treasury Department is whether it should treat the securities as
equity, potentially by using its regulatory authority. (Section III
below considers this question.)
The corporate tax contains numerous other distinctions. For
example, some corporate acquisitions are treated as taxable while
others are tax-free.53 Some distributions to shareholders are taxable
while others are tax-free.54 The distinctions between the taxable
forms of these transactions and the tax-free forms is ethereal. A
single dollar of cash can, in some circumstances, make an otherwise
48

See the description of the so-called “ARCN’s” in Rev. Rul. 83-98,
1983-2 CB 40.
49 See David Hariton, Distinguishing Between Debt and Equity in the New
Financial Environment, 49 TAX L. REV. 499 (1993).
50 MIPS stands for Monthly Income Preferred Stock. Other acronyms for
the same security are QUIPS (Quarterly Income Preferred Stock) and TRUPS
(Trust Preferred Securities). The differently named instruments differ only i n
tiny details.
51 See Hariton, supra note 49, for a description of the details of MIPS.
52 See letter from Robert T. Flaherty (on file with the author).
53 See Bernard Wolfman, Whither “C”?, 38 TAX N OTES 1269 (1988), for a
description of some of the disparities.
54 See George Yin, A Different Approach to the Taxation of Corporate
Distributions: Theory and Implementation of a Uniform Corporate-Level
Distributions Tax, 78 GEO . L. J. 1837 (1990) for a description of these
differences.
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tax-free acquisition into a taxable purchase.55 In other circumstances,
well more than half the consideration can be cash without
disqualifying a transaction as tax-free.56 Some debt securities may
count effectively as stock rather than cash, but some stock and most
stock options (sometimes) are treated like debt.57 The order of
interchangeable steps frequently determines the results.58 It is
difficult to detect any discernable patterns in the law.
Corporate tax doctrine makes these distinctions. The function of
the rules is to distinguish the various similar forms of transactions
from one another. Because of the complexity of the distinctions, the
doctrine is complex. The Bittker & Eustice59 and the Ginsburg &
Levin60 treatises are devoted to explaining the lines drawn within the
corporate tax. Each is over two thousand pages long, and neither
resolves all issues. Without a reason for having the corporate tax,
however, it is not easy to justify the distinctions, and explaining
them through doctrine simply becomes a list of arbitrary details.
The realization requirement, the debt/equity distinction, and
other distinctions in the corporate tax have the same basic structure.
Between relatively fixed points there is a continuous range of
transactions, and within the range there is considerable doctrinal
uncertainty. This is, I believe, the basic structure of most line
drawing problems in the tax law. Assuming the end points are fixed,
the difficult question for taxpayers and tax policymakers is how to
deal with the transactions in the middle.
55

See section 368(a)(1)(B) imposing a “solely” for stock requirement for
so-called “B” reorganizations.
56 See section 368(a)(1)(A) and John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296
U.S. 374 (1935) (allowing a reorganization to be tax free with only 38 percent
stock).
57 Compare section 351(g) (treating preferred stock like debt) with 356(d)
(treating some debt like stock). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.356-6 (treating warrants
like stock for some purposes).
58 See Commissioner v. Court Holding, 324 U.S. 331 (1945);
Cumberland Public Service Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 451 (1950); and
Esmark Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171 (1988).
59 B ORIS BITTKER & JAMES E USTICE , FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
OF C ORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, (6th ed. 1994)
60 MARTIN G INSBURG & JACK LEVIN , M ERGERS, A CQUISITIONS AND
BUYOUTS (July 1997).
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An important feature of the realization requirement, the
debt/equity distinction, and the corporate tax is that they have little
or no underlying normative content. They are, in this sense,
meaningless distinctions. Of course, not all distinctions in the tax
law have this wonderful feature, and one might argue that the
doctrinal uncertainty is a result of this lack of normative content. I
believe that many, if not most distinctions in the tax law similarly
lack content.61 The realization requirement and the corporate tax are
sufficiently fundamental that vast numbers of tax rules stem from
these distinctions alone.62 And one need only to look at a typical tax
61 One might wonder why they arise if they lack normative content. One
possibility is that they arise out of historical anomalies that no longer (or never
did) have a good normative base. For example, Professor Marjorie Kornhauser
has traced the origins of the corporate tax to theories on the nature of the
corporation as a person, a theory most would now find wanting. See Marjorie
E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax,
66 IND . L. J. 53 (1990). Even aside from theories of corporate personality, the
corporate tax was enacted prior to the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment to
the Constitution. Corporate income taxes were constitutional at that time while
individual income taxes were not. See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107
(1911) (holding that the corporate tax enacted in 1909, four years before the
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, was constitutional). Given the strong
desire to tax income, a corporate tax was the only choice. When the Sixteenth
Amendment was ratified and the individual income tax was imposed, the
corporate tax could have been eliminated, but was not, creating the two-tier tax
system.
The realization requirement appears to be the result of confused thinking
by the Supreme Court and an unthinking desire for conformity with the
accounting rules (which themselves have historical roots). See Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, The Origins of Capital Gains Taxation: What’s Law Got To Do With
It?, 39 SW . L. R. 869 (1985).
62 Professor Andrews has referred to the realization requirement as the
Achilles’ Heel of the income tax. William Andrews, The Achilles Heel of Income
Taxation, in TAXATION FOR THE 1980'S (Charles Walker ed., 1983). Once
the realization requirement is imposed, a wide variety of other doctrines are
needed to implement it. For example, the loss restriction rules (partially
contained in I.R.C. §§ 465 (at-risk rules), 469 (passive activity losses), 1091
(wash sales), 1092 (straddles), 1211 (capital losses)), the depreciation rules (in
sections 167 and 168), the capital gains rules (partially contained in I.R.C. § §
1221, 1221, and 1223) and the various timing rules (including I.R.C. § §
163(d) (interest deduction limitations), 461(h) (economic performance rules),
1272-75 (the original issue discount rules) and 7872 (low-interest loans) all
stem from the realization requirement and this list is only a tiny fragment of

CHICAGO WORKING PAPER IN LAW AND ECONOMICS

20

reform proposal to get a sense of the number of other distinctions
that can be eliminated.63 Meaningless distinctions are pervasive in
the tax system.
Moreover, even distinctions that have normative content have
the same basic structure: fixed points, a continuous range of
transactions between the fixed points, and uncertainty in the
middle.64 For example, the boundary between personal expenses and
business expenses is supported by basic notions of the appropriate tax
base and yet has this same structure We generally tax consumption,
so expenses for personal consumption are not deductible. Business
expenses, however, are a cost of producing income and, therefore,
must be netted against total receipts (either through a deduction or
over time through recovery of “basis”) to measure income. There are
some things we know are business expenses, like the cost of
inventory, and some things we know are personal expenses, such as
the cost of a meal with friends. But there is a vast area between these
two, and actually drawing the line between the two is not easy. We
must decide, for example, whether corner offices, business trips to
Aspen, or three martini lunches are business expenses or
consumption. We must decide whether commuting expenses, child
care, work clothes, and meals eaten in the office should be
deductible. Merely knowing that a distinction must be made is not
sufficient to determine where the line should be drawn.
The doctrines governing these various activities are byzantine.
We must, for example, decide whether meals are for the convenience
of the employer, whether sufficient business is conducted at
mealtime, whether employee discounts are excessive, whether home
offices are exclusively used for business, or whether work clothes can

the rules that have as their ultimate justification the realization requirement.
See Brown, supra note 26, for a more complete list of doctrinal distinctions that
could be eliminated if the realization requirement were eliminated. The
corporate tax is not responsible for as many tax rules (although it is responsible
for a reasonable mass of rules – rules that can be explained only by several
thousand pages of treatise text), but any policy decision on the taxation of
capital income must take into account the effect of the corporate tax.
63 See e.g., Hall & Rabushka, supra note 21.
64 This structure, in fact, is common to most legal rules. See Schauer,
supra note 6 and Hart, supra note 7 at 126.
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be worn outside of the office.65 This sample is only the tip of the
iceberg. Much of the introductory tax class is devoted to exploring
the intricate doctrines for making this distinction. Thus, even in
cases where the distinction has some normative content, there is a
difficult, doctrinally and normatively uncertain area between the
fixed points.
The extent to which there are compelling reasons for drawing a
line in a given place will vary. In my view, most of the hard
distinctions in the tax law lack a sufficient normative foundation for
line drawing, either because there is no normative content to the
distinction or the existing normative content is indeterminate at the
boundaries. In cases, if any, where the underlying reasons are
sufficient to determine the boundaries of the distinction, the
policymakers have it easy. The focus here is on the more difficult,
and far more common cases, the meaningless distinctions.
To the extent one believes that courts and agencies should be
bound by the methods of statutory interpretation, there is a method,
of sorts, for at least some actors to draw lines. To this extent, the
focus of this article is on Congress or a benevolent policymaker
making a legislative proposal, where, in either case, the rules of
statutory interpretation do not apply. This removes any institutional
concerns about the appropriate role of various actors in our
government. To the extent one believes that courts and, particularly,
agencies, have discretion other than merely to apply the literal words
of a statute, implement clear congressional will, or apply some other
rule of statutory interpretation, this article addresses these actors. In
at least some cases, the Treasury Department has the discretion
necessary to address the line drawing problem in a fundamental
manner and the discussion applies in at least these cases.66
65 Generally I.R.C. § 162 governs the treatment of these deductions and
allows them only to the extent they are ordinary and necessary business
expenses. More specific rules are provided, among other sections, in I.R.C. § §
119 (meals provided by employers) 132 (fringe benefits generally, including
employee discounts); 274 (meals paid for by employers); and 280A (home
offices). See also W ILLIAM KLEIN & JOSEPH BANKMAN, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION (11th ed.), for numerous other examples and problems.
66 For example, as noted in text accompanying note 49, section 385
delegates to the Treasury the authority to distinguish between debt and equity.
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B. Traditional Theory Fails
Traditional methods of evaluating tax policy, most
importantly, the Haig-Simons notion of income, horizontal equity,
and the notion of ability to pay, fail when applied to the line
drawing problem. This section will examine the application of
traditional tax policy to line drawing.67 Before doing so, it is worth
examining the most typical method of line drawing, doctrinal
reasoning.68
The typical approach to line drawing is platonic. It attempts to
find the essential meaning of words, such as corporation,
partnership, debt, equity, selling, or holding, and draws lines
accordingly. For example, the old regulations distinguishing
corporations from partnerships looked to the meaning of the words
“corporation” and “partnership” to create a list of factors that
distinguished the two. Similarly, doctrine distinguishing debt and
equity looks to the typical features of “debt” and “equity.”69
The appropriate overlap between direct pursuit of good law with
institutional considerations, such as deference to Congress, is well-beyond the
scope of this article. There is at least some argument, however, that courts and
agencies should directly pursue appropriate legal results in some cases,
notwithstanding these institutional concerns.
67 It has become commonplace to criticize the traditional tax theories. See
supra note 5. The argument here falls short of these more general criticisms. It
focuses only on whether these theories are helpful for line drawing problems.
One can believe in the traditional tax theories but agree with the argument
made here.
68 Another important approach to line drawing by courts and agencies is
to look to congressional intent. As noted above, congressional intent is
indeterminate for many lines in the tax laws, particularly so for hard problems.
In addition, line drawing by Congress itself cannot be informed by reference to
congressional intent. As noted in text accompanying note 65, to the extent one
believes the usual methods of statutory interpretation are binding on courts and
agencies, the article may be viewed as addressing Congress or a benevolent
policy maker. To the extent courts and the Treasury Department have
discretion, the article addresses these actors as well.
69 See Plumb, supra note 1, and Hariton, supra note 49 for a summary of
the doctrine. There are numerous other examples of this approach. For
example, one of the major reasons for the most significant change in corporate
tax law in decades, the repeal of the so-called General Utilities doctrine, was the
integrity of the corporate tax. See H.R. REP. NO . 99-426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
281 (1985). To believe this, one has to believe that there is some platonic
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The platonic approach does not work as a general method of
drawing lines. The platonic or essentialist notions contained in
doctrinal rules are not tied to values we might want in a tax system.70
Tax doctrines do not, for example, necessarily make the system more
equitable, simpler, or more efficient. Platonic approaches also cannot
be defended on pragmatic grounds. In many cases, the words
themselves have no readily accessible meaning. The result is that the
platonic approach does not make the system more certain.
For example, it is difficult, or impossible, to determine whether
a particular event should be a realization event by reference to a
definition of the term “realization.” When applied outside of the
most direct context of a sale, it lacks meaning. And a determination
made this way will not necessarily make the tax system more fair,
more equitable, or more administrable. Similarly, the pre-check-thebox regulations distinguishing between partnerships and
corporations took the platonic approach. The terms “corporation”
and “partnership,” however, do not clearly reference common ideas,
particularly in the hard cases where the boundaries of a category are
unclear. Platonic reasoning created only complexity and avoidance
opportunities. The platonic approach fails on theoretical grounds
(because it is not tied to values we care about) and on practical
notion of the corporate tax whose integrity can be compromised. (To be sure,
there are other reasons for the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, but this
reason is platonic.) Similarly, the 20 factors that are used to distinguish
between independent contractors and employees rely on platonic notions of
these categories. See Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296. The predominant
example of platonic thinking in scholarship is the debate over whether
particular items are “income.” Much of this debate discusses income as if it were
an independent concept whose meaning can be derived through reflection. For
a broad approach to tax reform based on a definition of income, see STANLEY
SURREY , P ATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX
EXPENDITURES (1973), Richard A. Musgrave, In Defense of a Concept of Income,
81 HARV . L. REV. 44 (1967). The same approach is used to address more
narrow issues, such as whether personal injury damages should be taxable. See,
for example, Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 C ORNELL L. REV. 143
(1992).
70 This observation, as applied more generally to legal issues, goes back at
least to Holmes. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARV . L. REV. 457 (1897). It has been a recurring theme in the literature
since then.
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grounds (because the words do not have sufficient clarity to be
useful). The platonic approach does not work as a general method.71
Policymakers and scholars looking beyond platonic thinking
usually look to what I will call traditional tax theory: the HaigSimons notion of income or its underlying partners in crime,
horizontal equity and ability to pay. Consider each theory, in order.
The Haig-Simons definition of income is often cited as the
most important income tax principle. Under the Haig-Simons
definition, income is the sum of consumption plus the change in
wealth during a taxable period. Implementing it would require
taxpayers to value their assets at the end of each taxable period and
include in income any increase in value and deduct from income any
decrease in value. The Haig-Simons definition does not offer
guidance for line drawing.
Most lines in the tax law are inconsistent with the HaigSimons definition. In these cases, the Haig-Simons definition offers
no guidance. Consider the taxation of three items that would be
taxed the same under the Haig-Simons definition, A, B, and C.
Assume that A and C are taxed differently and their taxation cannot
be changed. We must decide how to tax B, either like A or like C.
Think of this as deciding where to draw the line between things
taxed like A and things taxed like C. For example, selling an asset
and holding an asset are A and C. Transactions in the middle, such
as hedging, are B and must be taxed as a sale or not, like A or like C..
The Haig-Simons definition offers no guidance for this
problem. The assumption that A and C are taxed differently means
that the Haig-Simons definition is violated. Given that the basic
principle is violated, it is not clear whether B then is best treated like
A or like C. The Haig-Simons definition offers no help.
Consider the examples given above, the realization
requirement and the corporate tax. As discussed above, a number of
transactions such as selling and replacing, borrowing against
71 To be fair to courts and regulators that adopt the platonic approach,
there are arguments based on separation of powers that words should be
interpreted according to their plain meaning (whatever that is in this context),
which in some sense requires a platonic approach. See, e.g., Livingston, supra
note 36, for a summary of arguments on statutory interpretation in the field.
This paper leaves aside institutional concerns, such as separation of powers and
statutory interpretation.
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appreciation, and hedging, are difficult to classify under the
realization requirement. These transactions fall between selling and
holding an asset in a world where selling is treated differently than
holding, but taxpayers should, under the assumed Haig-Simons
ideal, pay the same tax regardless of whether they sell or hold. In the
language used above, selling is A, holding is C, and the issue is the
treatment of the intermediate transactions, B.
The Haig-Simons definition cannot help determine whether
any of the intermediate events, the B’s, should be treated as
realization events because it does not admit the possibility of a
realization requirement. One might suggest that intermediate cases
should be taxed under the Haig-Simons definition,72 but there is no
reason to impose Haig-Simons taxation on the intermediate
transactions merely because the treatment of these transactions
under the realization requirement is uncertain. A presumption in
favor of creating a realization event may not improve things. For
example, it may cause taxpayers to change their behavior, increasing
distortions caused by the realization requirement (primarily the socalled lock-in effect) and reducing the fairness or efficiency of the
tax system.73 Haig-Simons taxation allows nothing short of perfect
taxation (under its terms) and, therefore, does not provide help to
decide where to draw lines in the tax law.74
72 For example, David Shakow, Wither “C”!, 45 TAX L REV. 177 (1990)
would rewrite substantial portions of the corporate tax law for the sole reason of
adhering to this rule of thumb.
73 The lock-in effect is the incentive for taxpayers to hold assets rather
than sell to avoid taxation. Taxpayers are locked in to assets with substantial
appreciation even if they would rather sell. See Zodrow, supra note 2.
74 The best argument for using the Haig-Simons approach is that
thousands of lines mus be drawn in the tax law, and, over time, an optimal
solution almost certainly is to move all the lines in the direction of either of
the two competing norms, income or consumption. Adherence to the HaigSimons definition for a given line may then be preferable even if inefficient i n
the short run. In addition, the Haig-Simons definition may be easier to
determine than the efficient line in a given context. Even if this argument is
correct, we must be careful taking this argument too far as, in the short run,
blind adherence to the Haig-Simons definition can cause significant
inefficiencies. See, e.g., Shakow, supra note 71 (which proposes significantly
changing the corporate tax regime merely to move it closer to the Haig-Simons
definition, completely without regard to the effects of the proposal).
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The Haig-Simons definition performs even worse with
respect to the distinction between debt and equity. Under a pure
Haig-Simons tax, there would be no distinction between debt and
equity because there would be no two-tier corporate tax. The
problems with applying the Haig-Simons definition to the
distinction between debt and equity are so severe that I am not
aware of a single article that attempts to apply it to help make the
distinction.
While the realization requirement and the corporate tax are
inconsistent with the Haig-Simons definition of income, some lines
are consistent with the Haig-Simons definition. One might hope
that the Haig-Simons definition would offer guidance in these
cases. The distinction between personal and business expenses is an
example of such a line.75 The problem with applying the HaigSimons definition to these lines is that it is just a definition. The
issue for mixed personal and business expenses, and for other difficult
line drawing issues, is where the boundaries of the definition should
be. One cannot look to the definition itself for that determination.
Thus, the Haig-Simons definition does not help even for lines that
are consistent with its strictures.
The other important traditional tax criteria is horizontal
equity. Horizontal equity is even weaker for line drawing problems
than the Haig-Simons definition.76 Horizontal equity requires
taxing equals equally. What is “equal” is not defined, so in some sense
horizontal equity is a tautology.77 Usually, however, equality is
defined by reference to the Haig-Simons definition. If this is the
case, the problems with the Haig-Simons definition will infect
75
76

See text accompanying note 63 for a discussion of this distinction.
Horizontal equity has, in particular, been criticized as meaningless. See
Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42
N ATIONAL TAX J. 139 (1989) (criticizing horizontal equity as derivative of
more fundamental notions of distributive justice); Richard A. Musgrave,
Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 N ATIONAL TAX J. 113 (1990) (defending
horizontal equity as an independent norm). See generally, Peter Westen, The
Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982). For purposes of this
paper, the exchange between Kaplow and Musgrave is secondary because even if
horizontal equity has meaning, it would not be helpful for purposes of
meaningless distinctions.
77 See Kaplow, id.
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horizontal equity as well. If a distinction is consistent with the
Haig-Simons definition, horizontal equity offers no additional
guidance. If the distinction is inconsistent with the Haig-Simons
definition, wherever the line is drawn, horizontal equity will be
violated. If A is taxed differently than C is taxed, horizontal equity
cannot help determine the taxation of B. If B is taxed like A,
horizontal equity is violated because B must also be taxed like C, and
if B is taxed like C, horizontal equity is violated because B must also
be taxed like A.
The realization example given above is again applicable.
Transactions that fall between selling and holding cannot be treated
like both. If they are treated as a sale, they are not treated the same as
holding, and if they are treated as holding, they are not treated the
same as a sale. Horizontal equity will always be violated, and it
provides no principle for deciding between lesser and greater degrees
of violation. Similarly, horizontal equity cannot help distinguish
between debt and equity. By assumption it is violated if there is a
distinction between the treatment of similar instruments.
A third traditional tax norm is the principle that each
individual should pay taxes in accordance with her ability. The ability
to pay principle has long been criticized as too vague to provide
meaningful guidance for tax policy, but it continues to be cited as
fundamental.78 Regardless of whether it is generally useful, it does
not provide help for most line drawing problems. The reasons are
the same as the reasons for the failure of the Haig-Simons
definition and horizontal equity. Ability to pay provides no method
for balancing considerations where, by assumption, it is violated in
some cases. For example, ability to pay principles do not help
distinguish between debt and equity.
There are two other slightly less prominent but more
promising strands of traditional theory. First, vertical equity is
commonly cited as a goal of the tax system. It is unclear exactly what
vertical equity means, but it is commonly used to mean taxing
differently situated taxpayers differently, with “differently situated”
78 See, e.g., STEPHEN G. U TZ , TAX P OLICY : AN INTRODUCTION AND
SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL DEBATE 41 (1993) (“the approach that claims the
largest following among prominent tax policy experts is one that . . . requires
that taxes be levied in accordance with taxable capacity or ‘ability to pay.’”)
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defined by reference to the Haig-Simons notion of income. Because
it relies on the Haig-Simons definition, it has the same problems as
the Haig-Simons definition. And vertical equity cannot help
determine which of similarly situated taxpayers should be treated
differently if we assume that some must, which is the nature of the
line drawing problem. Vertical equity is about differently situated
taxpayers.
An alternative formulation of vertical equity is simply a
concern with the distributional impact of taxes. In this formulation,
vertical equity has significant force, but it is not sufficient to answer
many questions on its own. For example, if the relevant distinction
does not have significant distributional consequences, vertical equity
will not matter. And few would argue that all distinctions should be
drawn solely by reference to the distributional consequences.
Distributional consequences of a decision are relevant but as will be
discussed below, I do not believe that for line drawing problems they
should be the primary consideration.
Second, traditional theory emphasizes efficiency. Efficiency is
usually defined simply as taxing all income as equally as possible. This
definition of efficiency does not help for the same reasons horizontal
equity does not help. If the assumption is that you are going to tax
similar income differently, this concept of efficiency is not
sufficiently nuanced to determine how to draw the line. Most of the
rest of this paper will be devoted to refining the notion of efficiency
to deal with line drawing within the tax law.
Because of the problems with traditional scholarship, scholarly
writing on the realization requirement and the distinction between
debt and equity is essentially non-existent. There is only a single
substantial article on the distinction between debt and equity, a 1971
article by William Plumb.79 The other major source of learning is a
79

Plumb, supra note 1. Jeremy I. Bulow, Lawrence H. Summers, &
Victoria P. Summers, Distinguishing Debt from Equity in the Junk Bond Era, in
DEBT , TAXES, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 135 (John B. Shoven and
Joel Waldfogel, eds. 1990), is a recent, thoughtful article on the subject. They
argue in part that the scope of the interest deduction should be based on its
effect on corporate behavior. They are particularly concerned about optimizing
corporate finance decisions. Their approach is consistent with the approach
recommended here. See also, Matthew P. Haskins, Recent Development: Can the
IRS Maintain the Debt-Equity Distinction in the Face of Structured Notes? 32
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chapter from the Bittker & Eustice treatise on the corporate tax.80
My guess is that the reason nobody else has written seriously on the
subject is because it is viewed as entirely unprincipled. This alone is
amazing given how important the debt/equity distinction is. It is
difficult to imagine a similar lack of scholarship between, say, an
enforceable contract and an unenforceable contract or between a
negligent action and a careful action.81
There is no major article analyzing the realization requirement
from the traditional perspective.82 This is so despite a recent
Supreme Court opinion that, in the eyes of many, significantly
changed the scope of the requirement,83 a recent statute modifying
the scope of the realization requirement (the stock hedging
mentioned above),84 and regulations interpreting the Supreme Court

HARV . J. ON LEGIS . 525 (1995); Margaret A. Gibson, The Intractable
Debt/Equity Problem: A New Structure for Analyzing Shareholder Advances, 81
NW . U.L. REV. 452 (1987); Adam O. Emmerich, Hybrid Instruments and the
Debt-Equity Distinction in Corporate Taxation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 118, (1985).
80 B ORIS I . BITTKER & JAMES S. E USTICE , FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF C ORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 4.02 (6th ed. 1994).
81 The reason for the lack of scholarship is not because the Plumb and
Bittker & Eustice articles are so good that nothing is left to say. Their
approach sheds little light on the appropriate distinction between debt and
equity. Both simply survey the case law and attempt to find patterns on the
cases, much along the lines of Langdellian scholars from ages past. The
underlying principles they develop from the case law look to see whether the
features of traditional debt and traditional equity are present in the financial
instrument in question. While this may be appropriate for a practitioner trying
to determine the likely treatment by the courts of a particular instrument, it
does not suffice for scholarship or for policymaking. Other scholarship in the
field, although less case-law oriented, takes the same approach. For example, a
recent article by David Hariton proposes that the only relevant question is to
what extent the instrument insulates the investor from the risks and rewards of
the issuer’s business. See Hariton, supra note 49. Hariton offers no support for
this test other than because participation in the business is a traditional feature
of equity, which is platonic reasoning.
82 Two recent article attempt to analyze the realization requirement from
an efficient perspective, which is the approach recommended here. See Shaviro,
supra note 5; Weisbach supra note 41.
83 Cottage Savings Ass’n, v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991).
84 I.R.C. § 1259.
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decision in one of its more important applications.85 The realization
requirement is simply not susceptible to traditional analysis.86
In sum, traditional scholarship has failed with respect to the
line drawing problem (except to argue that most distinctions should
be eliminated). Two bedrock elements of our tax system, the
realization requirement and the corporate tax (particularly the
debt/equity distinction), have not been and cannot be adequately
addressed through appeals to ability to pay, the Haig-Simons criteria,
horizontal equity, platonic notions or other similar arguments.
Scholarship addressing these areas is almost nonexistent, which is
stunning given their importance to our tax system. Moreover, line
drawing problems are pervasive and enduring. Virtually all tax
policymaking involves line drawing at some level. A method of
thinking about line drawing is vital.
II. An Efficiency Analysis of Line Drawing
If traditional analysis of line drawing cannot guide us, what can?
I will argue that lines in the tax law should be drawn solely by
reference to the consequences of where the line is drawn. In
particular, where a line is drawn affects behavior and, therefore, has
efficiency consequences. Drawing a line in a given place can be more
or less efficient than drawing it in a different place. Efficiency
should be the primary concern for line drawing in the tax law.

85
86

Treas. Reg. §1.1001-3.
There is more writing on the distinction between personal and business
expenses, some of it focusing on efficiency issues. See, e.g., Thomas D.
Griffith, Efficient Taxation of Mixed Personal and Business Expenses, 41 UCLA
L. REV. 1769 (1994); Avery Katz & Gregory Mankiw, How Should Fringe
Benefits Be Taxed?, 38 N AT’L TAX J. 37 (1985). See also Daniel I. Halperin,
Business Deduction for Personal Living Expenses: A Uniform Approach to an
Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA L. REV. 859 (1974); William A. Klein, The
Deductibility of Transportation Expenses of a Combination Business and Pleasure
Trip – A Conceptual Analysis, 18 S TAN . L. REV. 1099 (1966). This writing
often refers directly to the underlying goals of distributive justice such as
efficiency and distributional concerns. I suspect the reason why the writing on
the personal, business boundary takes this approach but the writing on other
distinctions, such as the debt, equity distinction, does not, is that it is easier to
locate the personal, business decision in these underlying goals.
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A change in where a line is drawn can also affect the distribution
of the tax burden, and if one cares about consequences, distributional
concerns are important. Nevertheless, I will argue that it is usually
the case for line drawing problems that we are best off drawing lines
to be efficient and adjusting the tax rates to achieve an appropriate
distribution of the tax burden.
This section begins by defining efficiency, as used here, and then
develops some intuitions for applying it to line drawing, using the
running examples, the realization requirement and the debt/equity
boundary as illustrations. At a minimum, this first step shows that
the line drawing problem can be analyzed in a principled fashion,
which is a step well beyond current thinking. This section will then
argue that efficiency is the appropriate concern, briefly discussing the
reasons for drawing lines by reference to the consequences of the
decision and then considering distributional concerns.
A. Applying Efficiency to Line Drawing Problems
This section begins with a definition of an efficient tax and an
example of how the definition can be used to determine a tax
structure. The discussion is essentially a brief summary of concepts
found in standard texts in public finance.87 With that background,
this section extends the usual concepts of efficient taxes to line
drawing.
1. Definition of an Efficient Tax
The efficiency of a tax is measured by the so-called “dead weight
loss,” or “excess burden” of the tax. Dead weight loss results from the
lost consumer (and producer) surplus when the after-tax world is
compared to the before-tax world.
87

See H ARVEY S. R OSEN , PUBLIC FINANCE, (4th ed. 1995) OR JOSEPH
E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR, (2d ed. 1988) for a good
undergraduate text, and RICHARD W. TRESCH , PUBLIC FINANCE: A
NORMATIVE THEORY (1981) or ANTHONY B. ATKINSON & JOSEPH E.
S TIGLITZ, LECTURES IN PUBLIC E CONOMICS (1980) for more advanced
work. See also H ANDBOOK OF PUBLIC E CONOMICS , (Alan Auerbach &
Martin Feldstein eds. 1985) for a good but technical survey of the public
finance literature. Survey articles on optimal tax theory also provide a good
introduction to the subject. See., e.g., Nicholas Stern, The Theory of Optimal
Commodity and Income Taxation: An Introduction, in TAXATION FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Nicholas Stern & David Newberry eds. 1987).
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Dead weight loss is easiest to understand in terms of an example.
Assume that there are only two commodities in the world, wheat
and barley, that each sells for $1 per bushel, and that at that price,
consumers purchase 100 bushels of each during the year. Suppose
that the government imposes a 30 percent per bushel tax on wheat
and no tax on barley. If there were no change in behavior, the
government would raise $30 per year. But the price of wheat will go
up relative to the price of barley because of the tax, so consumers will
change their purchases. In the extreme, consumers will switch
entirely to barley. The government would raise no tax revenue, but
the loss to consumers might be large.88 If consumers purchased only
50 bushel of wheat (and spent their remaining money on barley),
the tax collected would be only $15, but the loss to consumers would
be more than $15. They would pay the $15 in tax and also switch
some of their consumption from wheat to barley, contrary to their
preferences. Of course, the tax revenue raised does not count as dead
weight loss because that revenue is simply transferred to the
government. The difference between the tax revenue raised and the
loss in value to the consumers is the “dead weight loss” of the tax. An
efficient tax is simply a tax with low dead weight loss.
The notion of dead weight loss is often demonstrated
graphically. Suppose wheat, the taxed commodity in the above
example, has the supply and demand curves depicted in Figure 1.
The price and quantity of wheat are, without tax, P1 and Q1 . The
consumer surplus is the triangle ACE. Suppose a tax of t is imposed
on each unit. The price then goes up to P2 (= P1 +t) and the quantity
goes down to Q2 . The loss to the consumer is the trapezoid BCEF.
The tax raised is the shaded rectangle BDEF. The difference
between the tax raised and the loss to the consumer, the shaded
triangle BCD, is the dead weight loss from the tax. Dead weight loss
is related to the change in the demand for the commodity in
response to the change in the price caused by the tax. The size of the
triangle is 1/2t(Q1 -Q2 ) (with t stated as an absolute, per item tax),
88

If wheat and barley were perfect substitutes, so that even penney tax on
wheat would cause consumers to switch to barley, then, arguably, there would
be no loss to consumers and no revenue raised. A tax that raises revenue will
always create dead weight loss, however (other than a tax that is unavoidable
such as a poll tax).
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which can easily be shown to be equal to 1/2εP1 Q1 t2 , where ε is the
price elasticity of demand (and with t stated as a percentage tax).89
Tax Revenue
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Dead Weight Loss
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D
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Figure 1
The example above is too simple because the government could
just tax all commodities, barley and wheat, without changing relative
prices. Taxes in the real world change relative prices because at least
one commodity, leisure, cannot be taxed. If everything but leisure
were taxed at a uniform rate, the relative price of leisure would
become cheaper, creating dead weight loss. Individuals might prefer
to work more (or less) or consume more (or less), but they do not
because of the tax. Thus, dead weight loss from taxation is
unavoidable.
One might think from this discussion that an efficient tax would
leave pre-tax behavior entirely undisturbed. This intuition is close but
not exactly right. Individuals will have less revenue after paying taxes.
If they have less revenue, they should change their behavior. For
example, if a person would eat caviar every night absent taxes and the
government takes half of his money through taxes, he should not
continue eating caviar every night. Instead, he should behave like
someone with half the money he originally had. Rice and beans
89

1/2εPQt2 = 1/2 (∆Q/∆P) (P/Q) PQt2 = 1/2 (∆Q/tP) (P/Q) PQt2 = 1/2
∆QPt = 1/2(Q1 - Q2)t* (with t stated as a percentage tax and t* the equivalent per
item tax).
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every few nights would be the appropriate behavior. What we do not
want to do is to allow the tax to distort the choice between rice,
beans, and caviar for that person given his after-tax income.
Thus, tax efficiency is concerned with the difference between
consumers’ actual behavior, after taxes, and the behavior they would
engage in merely because they have less revenue. If the tax changes
the relative prices between rice, beans, and caviar, then our sample
consumer’s behavior will be different from the behavior that results
merely because of the loss of income.90 It is this difference that
creates the inefficiency.
The concept of efficiency can be defined more rigorously.
Consider a thought experiment in which the government takes
money from a consumer through taxes (and therefore changes
relative prices) and then gives back to the consumer the money raised
through a lump sum distribution (which does not change relative
prices).91 The consumer has no net change in revenue. (Assume for
the moment that the government’s administrative costs are zero.
Any administrative costs will just add to the inefficiency.) The tax,
however, will change the relative prices of goods, which will change
behavior and reduce utility relative to the untaxed world, even if all
the tax revenue is returned to the consumer. To keep utility
constant, the government would have to give the consumer more
money than it raised with the tax. The dead weight loss from a tax is
the difference between the amount raised by the tax and the amount
that would be needed to give back to the consumer to make the
consumer indifferent to the tax. Note that because the tax revenue is
returned to the consumer, the changes in behavior because of the
reduction in income from the tax are eliminated, leaving just the
changes in behavior induced by price changes. An efficient tax is a
tax with low dead weight loss.92
90 The loss in income will often cause a change in relative prices because,
as noted above, people with less income may change their consumption
patterns, which will change the demand for various goods. Taxation will
change relative prices from this set of prices, causing inefficiency.
91 Other than by increasing income, which will cause a shift in the supply
and demand for various commodities.
92 Note that this definition of dead weight loss uses the so-called “Hicks
compensating variation” measure in which the consumer’s utility is held
constant through compensating payments. An alternative formulation known
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Four comments should be made. First, there are some terms of
art from the economics literature that will be useful in discussing the
application of efficiency to line drawing. Economists break down
the response to a change in prices into the income effect and the
substitution effect. The income effect is the effect on behavior
caused by the change in net income to the consumer from the tax,
leaving relative prices the same. The substitution effect is the change
in behavior from the change in relative prices, leaving income the
same. As noted above in the discussion of the caviar lover, efficiency
is not concerned with income effects. Efficiency depends solely on
so-called “substitution effects.” Reviewing the definition of
efficiency given above will make it apparent that it isolates the
substitution effect. Because it focuses only on substitution effects,
efficiency relies on the so-called “Hicksian” or “compensated demand
curve.” The compensated demand curve is the schedule of quantities
demanded by the consumer as prices change, assuming additional
income is given to (or taken from) the consumer to keep him
indifferent to the change in prices (i.e., hold utility constant). The
“price elasticity of demand” is the percentage change in quantity
demanded for a percentage change in price. A commodity’s “own
elasticity of demand” refers to a percentage change in its own price.
A “cross-elasticity of demand” refers to a percentage change in
quantity of one commodity with respect to a percentage change in
the price of another commodity. A “compensated elasticity” is an
elasticity computed by reference to the compensated demand curve.
Because compensated demand curves are the relevant functions,
compensated elasticity is the relevant elasticity, throughout the
remaining text, I will use demand curve and elasticity to mean
compensated demand and compensated elasticity.
Second, the definition of an efficient tax assumes perfect
markets. Changes in relative prices of goods are assumed to reduce
welfare. This, of course, is a strong assumption. To the extent there
is market failure, the definition of an efficient tax changes. In
as the “Hicks equivalent variation” measures the difference between taxes raised
and the amount the consumer would pay to maintain the pre-tax prices. For
purposes of this discussion, the two measures are effectively equivalent. The
example in the text of wheat and barley relied on the Hicks equivalent variation
rather than the Hicks compensating variation.
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particular, so-called Pigouvian taxes are taxes (or subsidies) that
attempt to cure market failures. For example, a tax on polluters
might help them internalize the cost of the pollution that they
impose on society. Similarly, if the structure of an industry allows
economic profits, the profits can be taxed. The notion of efficiency
assumes that where Pigouvian taxes are appropriate they should be
used.93
Third, the model eliminates the distributional effects of taxes.
The loss experiment relies on the assumption that there is only a
single representative consumer, which means distributional concerns
are ignored. Not all consumers are alike, and the loss experiment,
which requires returning the tax revenue to consumers, is
indeterminate once we allow for differences among consumers.
Moreover, the redistributive effects of a tax will determine, in part,
its welfare effects and must generally be considered. Section _ below
contains a discussion of distributional issues and argues that the
single consumer model is usually the appropriate model for decisions
regarding line drawing problems.
Fourth, the notion of efficiency used here is somewhat different
from notions of efficiency commonly used in the law and economics
literature. The two common notions used in this literature are
Pareto efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.94 A state of affairs is
Pareto efficient if nobody can be made better off without making
someone else worse off. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency requires that those
who benefit from a change could make transfer payments to those
who are hurt by a change such that the change would then be
Pareto efficient.
The definition of efficiency given above relied on a single
representative consumer, so notions of transfer payments or
93

Some market imperfections cannot readily be eliminated with a
Pigouvian tax. Of particular relevance, information may be costly and offsetting
this problem with a Pigouvian tax is not possible. Except where specifically
noted, I will generally assume that information is costless because the case of a
perfect market is sufficiently informative. See Louis Kaplow, Accuracy,
Complexity, and the Income Tax, 14 J. L. E CON . & ORG ’N 61 (1998) for a
discussion of information costs and taxation.
94 See JEFFRIE G. M URPHY & JULES L. C OLEMAN , THE P HILOSOPHY
OF L AW , AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 182-187 (1990) for a basic
discussion of these notions of efficiency.
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distributional effects are absent. The Kaldor-Hicks definition is
sometimes used as if it separated efficiency from distributional
concerns, while the definition of efficiency used here does not; it
explicitly applies only to the single consumer case.95 With this
limitation, the notion of efficiency given above is related to KaldorHicks efficiency, in that a more efficient tax creates additional utility
in society that can be potentially be redistributed through cash
payments.
2. Using the Measure of Efficiency to Determine Taxes
The efficiency goal for tax policy is to find the tax that causes the
lowest dead weight loss. A seminal application of this concept was
by the economist Frank Ramsey, whose results (and others’
extensions) usually are called “optimal commodity taxation.” This
section describes the Ramsey result which is used in the next section
to examine line drawing.
The most efficient tax system is the tax that raises the necessary
revenue with the lowest dead weight loss. A tax system will have the
lowest dead weight loss if and only if the change in dead weight loss
from a change in the tax on a commodity (the marginal dead weight
loss) is equal for all commodities. Suppose this were not true. Then
the tax system with the lowest total dead weight loss creates
different marginal dead weight loss for different commodities, say
the marginal dead weight loss due to the tax on A is higher than on
B. Suppose we increase the tax on B and reduce the tax on A,
keeping revenue constant. The increase in tax on B will not increase
dead weight loss as much as the decrease in tax on A will reduce dead
weight loss because the marginal dead weight loss on B is lower than
95 That is, there is no claim that one can separate equity and efficiency.
Instead, the single consumer case is used only to develop intuitions about the
more general, multi-consumer case and one must be careful to ensure that the
intuitions carry over. In the multi-consumer case, discussed in section _ below,
distributional concerns cannot, except under special conditions, be separated
cleanly from efficiency concerns. The only valid mode of analysis in this case
is often a direct reference to the social welfare function without regard to Pareto
or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency or the measure of dead weight loss used here.
The Kaldor-Hicks criteria is often used by those use claim wealth
maximization is the appropriate notion of distributive justice. See RICHARD A .
POSNER , THE E CONOMICS OF JUSTICE 48-115 (1983). Wealth maximization
is not a notion of distributive justice that is relied upon in this paper.
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on A. This means the change reduces dead weight loss while
keeping revenue constant, contrary to the initial assumption.
Therefore, the most efficient tax will set the marginal dead weight
loss equal for all commodities.
In addition, the size of the dead weight loss from a tax on an
item is related to the elasticity of demand of the item. The greater
the elasticity, the more the demand changes for a change in price
induced by a given tax, and the greater the economic distortion. For
example, if in the wheat/barley example given above, wheat has a
high elasticity, consumers will substitute away from wheat toward
barley and the dead weight loss will be high. Therefore, taxing
commodities with a low elasticity will generally be more efficient
than taxing commodities with high elasticity.
Nevertheless, the ability to raise taxes on high elasticity items is
limited because as the tax on a commodity increases, the marginal
dead weight loss increases. In particular, it can be shown that dead
weight loss increases with the square of the tax rate and, therefore,
marginal dead weight loss increases with the tax rate. Thus, the
elasticity conclusion is tempered. We cannot raise the rate on a
high-taxed, low-elasticity item indefinitely. Eventually, the marginal
dead weight loss will be the same for a low-taxed, high-elasticity
item. Taxing any one commodity at too high a rate, even one with a
low elasticity, will create undue excess loss.
The intuition can be developed using the same diagram used
above to illustrate dead weight loss. Figure 2 shows a commodity
with a low elasticity (the percentage quantity change is relatively
little for a percentage price change). We want to measure marginal
dead weight loss, which is the loss from a change in the tax from P2
to P2 plus a small increase in the tax, t. The increase in dead weight
loss from the increase in tax is the shaded trapezoid ABCD. The size
of the marginal dead weight loss depends not only on the elasticity
of the demand for the commodity but on the existing level of tax.
The higher the existing tax, the larger the marginal dead weight loss
from an increase in the tax.
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Figure 2
If the elasticity were low, then the marginal dead weight loss
would be represented by the shaded trapezoid in Figure 3. To set
marginal dead weight loss equal in each case, we need to know the
existing level of taxes and the elasticities. The trapezoid in Figure 2 is
skinnier but taller and to set the areas of the trapezoids equal one
needs to know both the width and the height.
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The Ramsey result is that taxes should vary inversely with the
elasticity of demand for a commodity. That is, mathematically, the
combination of factors, the width and height of the marginal dead
weight loss trapezoids, work out so that the tax rate should be exactly
inverse to the commodities’ elasticities. If the elasticity is high, the
tax should be low and the if the elasticity is low the tax should be
high. The rate on a low elasticity commodity, however, should not
be so high that the marginal dead weight loss exceeds the marginal
dead weight loss on other commodities.
The restrictions to produce the inverse elasticity rule are quite
strict (most importantly that the price of one commodity does not
depend on the price of other commodities). In the more general
case, the Ramsey result is that taxes should be set so that the
percentage change in demand for all commodities caused by the
taxes is equal (the equal percentage change rule). The intuition is
similar to the inverse elasticity rule, with the only major difference
being that we must pay attention to the effect of the tax on one
commodity on the demand for another. Like the inverse elasticity
rule, to set the tax this way will generally require different rates on
different commodities, and high elasticity commodities will attract
low tax rates.96 (Appendix B includes, as part of a model of the line
drawing problem, a derivation of both results.97)
3. Applying Optimal Tax Results to Line Drawing
The question is how we can apply these insights to the line
drawing problem. The Ramsey model does not directly apply as it
allows the policymaker to set individualized rates on each
commodity, and there are no costs of classifying the commodities.
Line drawing is not a relevant issue in the Ramsey model. This
section considers three interpretations or extensions of the Ramsey
model that can be used to develop intuitions about the line drawing
problem.
96

Economists have specified the conditions under which this logic yields
a uniform rate on commodities. The general condition is that all goods must be
equal complements of leisure. See Atkinson & Stiglitz, supra note 25 at 379
(1980).
97 The derivation can also be found in standard public finance texts. See
supra note 86 for a list.

41

LINE D RAWING IN THE T AX L AW

Corlett and Hague, in a well-known interpretation of the
Ramsey model, assumed that there are three goods in the economy,
two of the goods are taxed at the same rate and the third good,
leisure, is (and must remain) untaxed.98 They asked whether we can
make a welfare improving tax change. That is, they studied an
hypothesized tax system and asked where there are any welfare
enhancing tax reforms. They found that a decrease the tax on the
good that is the better substitute for leisure and a corresponding
revenue neutral increase in the tax on the other good improves
welfare.99 The intuition behind the result is that by reducing the tax
on the substitute for leisure, the distortions caused by failure to tax
leisure are reduced. That is, because leisure is untaxed, individuals will
shift from substitutes for leisure (which are taxed) to leisure.
Reducing the tax on substitutes reduces the shifting. Similarly,
increasing the tax on complements to leisure makes engaging in
leisure more expensive, reducing the distortions caused by failure to
tax leisure.
A similar result was developed by Auerbach.100 He considered the
case where certain taxes cannot be changed (for whatever reason,
political or otherwise), and determined the optimal choice for the
remaining taxes. Consider the simple case where only two
commodities are taxed, and the tax on the first commodity is fixed at
a given amount and we are allowed to set the tax on the other.101
98

W. J. Corlett, & D.C. Hague, Complimentarity and the Excess Burden of
Taxation, 39 REV. OF ECON. STUDIES 87 (1953).
99 One good is a substitute for another if individuals will increase their
consumption of the substitute when the price of the other good increases. A
good is a complement for another if individuals will decrease their consumption
of the complement when the price of the other increases. A.K. Dixit, Welfare
Effects of Tax and Price Changes, 4 J. PUBLIC E CON . 103 (1975) generalized the
model to n goods.
100 See Alan J. Auerbach, Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation,
H ANDBOOK OF PUBLIC E CONOMICS , supra note 86 at 113. Auerbach
followed a model first proposed by Green. See H.A.J. Green, The Social
Optimum in the Presence of Monopoly and Taxation, 29 REV. OF E CON . STUDIES
66 (1961).
101 The model does not require the tax on the second commodity to raise
any particular amount of revenue. Revenue neutrality is maintained in the
model by adjusting a “lump sum” tax, which is a tax that cannot be altered
through behavior, such as a poll tax. The goal is to show that even in the
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Auerbach shows that in this case, the tax on the second commodity
should be set based on the ratio of (i) its cross-elasticity with the first
commodity to (ii) its own elasticity.102 Consider each element.
Recall that the cross-elasticity measures the percentage change in
the demand of a commodity for a percentage price change in
another. If the cross-elasticity is high (in absolute value), than the
commodity is either a good substitute to or a good complement for
the second commodity. The two commodities are closely related. If
the cross-elasticity is near zero, then the two commodities are largely
unrelated.
The cross-elasticity in the numerator of the ratio means the
higher (in absolute value) the cross-elasticity, the higher the tax (or
subsidy). This makes intuitive sense. If the second commodity is a
good substitute for the first (so that the cross-elasticity is high), a tax
on the second will reduce the distortions caused by the tax on the
first commodity. For example, if butter is taxed, a tax on margarine (a
substitute for butter) would reduce shifting from butter to
margarine. If the second commodity is a complement to the first,
the tax should be negative (a subsidy). Again this makes sense as the
subsidy will reduce distortions caused by the first tax. If right shoes
are taxed, a subsidy for left shoes will reduce the distortion caused by
the tax. And if the cross-elasticity is near zero, a tax or subsidy on the
second commodity will have little effect on the distortions caused by
the tax on the first.
A commodity’s own elasticity measures the sensitivity of its
demand to a change in its own price. Because the own-elasticity
factor is in the denominator, the size of the tax or subsidy suggested
by the cross-elasticity, is tempered: the higher the own-elasticity, the
lower the tax. This is consistent with the Ramsey intuition. From
the definition of dead weight loss we know that taxing a high
elasticity commodity will cause a large dead weight loss, which
means we should not tax it at too high a rate. If its own elasticity is
presence of lump sum taxation, a ‘distorting” tax on the second commodity may
improve welfare. This is directly within the tradition of “second best” results,
in which a change when considered in isolation may not seem appropriate, can
actually be welfare improving.
102 The formula is given by: θ = - θ (ε /ε ), where
2
1 12 22
i is the tax on
commodity i, and ε 12 is the cross- elasticity of commodity 1 for commodity 2
and ε22 is commodity 2's own elasticity.
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low, then we can impose a tax or a subsidy on the commodity with
low cost, so the size of the tax or subsidy will be greater than if its
own elasticity were high.103
The Corlett and Hague and the Auerbach models give intuitions
about line drawing. The models involve setting tax rates. We can
view line drawing as simply setting the rates on various transactions.
Treating a security as equity rather than debt changes the effective
tax rate on the security. Treating a transaction as a realization event
changes the tax rate on the transaction. Line drawing is a subset of
setting rates.
To apply the models, suppose we have three items, A, B, and C.
Assume A and C are taxed differently and are fixed, and we must
decide how to tax B. The models point to two factors. First, if B is a
close substitute for one but not the other, say it is a substitute for A
but not for C, then it makes sense to tax B like its substitute, A.
That is, in the Auerbach model, the higher the cross-elasticity, the
higher the tax. (I will call this the substitution factor and the
associated costs the substitution costs.) Second, we should not tax B
too much higher (or lower) than it would be absent the line drawing
limitation. That is, we do not want to tax B too “wrong” merely
because it should be taxed like close substitutes. (I will call this the
direct factor and the associated costs the direct costs.)
For example, consider an activity that falls between traditional
notions of realization and of holding (non-realization), say
103 In the more general case, where there are several pre-existing fixed
taxes and a single tax that we can change, the tax should be set equal to the
[fixed]-tax weighted average of the ratios.
A model by John Wilson provides a similar insight. See John D. Wilson,
On the Optimal Tax Base for Commodity Taxation, 79 A M . E CON . REV.
1196 (1989). Wilson considers the optimal number of commodities that should
be taxed under the assumption that adding additional commodities to the base
increases administrative costs. As commodities are added to the base, the
marginal distortion from taxation decreases (i.e., as the tax base gets closer to
ideal) but the marginal administrative cost increases. He finds that a rise in the
substitution elasticities between taxed and untaxed commodities increases the
optimal number of taxed commodities. This is consistent with the conclusion
of the Auerbach and Corlett and Hague models, that we should be concerned
about the substitutability of commodities that are taxed differently For a prior
paper along similar lines, see Shlomo Yitzhaki, A Note on Optimal Taxation and
Administrative Costs, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 475 (1979)
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borrowing against appreciation or hedging the risk of gain and loss.
If an activity is a close substitute for selling, then, all other things
being equal, it should be taxed as a sale. That is, activities that are just
“like” selling should be taxed like a sale because they are likely to be
close substitutes for selling. But if the activity has a high ownelasticity, taxing it as a sale would produce a large dead weight loss,
which acts as a countervailing factor. That is, if taxpayers can just
avoid the new rule by shifting to yet another transaction, taxing the
activity like a sale may not be efficient. If we can find a dividing line
so that substitutes are kept together and the activities treated like a
sale collectively have a low own-elasticity, then it both factors point
in the same direction and the rule will be efficient.
Similarly, consider a security that falls somewhere between equity
and debt. If the security is a closer substitute for equity than for debt,
it should be taxed as equity. The benefit of taxing it like its close
substitute, however, is limited because taxing the security as equity
will make the distortions caused by the corporate tax worse.104 If it is
a close substitute for debt, then we should tax it like debt. Both
factors point in the same direction in this case assuming debt
taxation produces fewer distortions than equity taxation. That is, we
should tax a security like its closest substitute but we should be more
expansive in applying this rule for debt than for equity because the
debt rules are generally better (cause fewer distortions) than the
equity rules.
A third model, which is given formally in Appendix B, is to
consider the case where there are three commodities (and leisure) but
only two tax rates are allowed. Thus, one of the commodities must
be taxed like one of the others, effectively drawing a line. For
example, commodity B must be taxed either like A or like C.
Effectively, we must draw a line to one side of B or the other. Thus,
B might be a transaction that either will or will not be treated as a
realization event. Modeling this case allows us to determine whether
dead weight loss is lower if B is taxed like A or like C. The goal is to
104

Note that the interpretation of the model here is somewhat loose.
Rather than focusing on own- elasticity as a measure of distortion caused by the
tax, I am using the more general distortions from the two-level corporate tax.
That is, I am using the denominator in the ratio as a proxy for the distortions
caused by taxing the item.
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simulate the line drawing problem more directly than either the
Corlett and Hague or the Auerbach models by including in the
model the discontinuity created by lines. B must be taxed either like
A or like C, which is the type of decision in line drawing.
The solutions for the optimal rate structure are similar to the
familiar Ramsey rule except that the optimal rates are based on the
weighted average of the commodities that are taxed similarly. Thus,
in the simple case (i.e., with the restrictions in the Ramsey model
that produce the inverse elasticity rule), if commodities A and B are
taxed at the same rate, the optimal rate is inverse to the weighted
average (by size of the market) of the elasticities of A and B. In the
more general case, the optimal rates create the same weightedaverage percentage reduction in the demand for the commodities. If
A and B are taxed at the same rate, the combined percentage
reduction in demand for A and B must be the same as the
percentage reduction in demand for C.
To determine whether it is best to tax B like A or like C we must
calculate dead weight loss for each situation given the optimal rates
and then choose the tax rule with the lower dead weight loss.
Intuition might be that dead weight loss is minimized if
commodities with the most similar elasticities are taxed the same.
This is not, in general, correct. The cost of deviating from the
optimal tax will be different for different commodities which means
we should be less willing to get it wrong for some items than for
others. In particular, the cost of being “wrong” by a given amount
for a high elasticity commodity will be higher than the cost of being
wrong for a low elasticity commodity. Thus, it is more important
that we not be wrong for high elasticity commodities than for low
elasticity commodities because the costs of doing so are higher. We
should be less willing to group commodity B with the high elasticity
commodity because the cost will often be higher than grouping B
with the low elasticity commodity. (The rates are set optimally
subject to a revenue constraint, so grouping B with a commodity
causes its rate to vary from the optimal rate.) That is, we should only
group commodity B with the high elasticity commodity if its
elasticity is somewhat closer than halfway between the two.105
105

In the general equilibrium case, optimal rates are set so that they cause
the same percentage reduction in the weighted average of the two commodities
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The conclusions from the three commodity, two tax model echo
the conclusions of the Auerbach model. Once again, if we consider a
transaction that falls between selling and holding, the transaction
should be taxed like its closest substitute (to take into account the
substitution costs), tempered by the need not to tax the transaction
too much if its elasticity it high (to take into account the direct
costs). A similar conclusion for the distinction between debt and
equity also follows—we should tax a security likes its closest
substitute but be a little more generous for debt than equity.
To summarize the discussion, the three models examined, the
Corlett and Hague model, the Auerbach model, and the three
commodity, two tax model, all introduce some imperfection in the
system and examine how to make the tax structure most efficient
given the imperfection. In this sense, the models are similar to the
line drawing problem, in which we assume that a line must be
drawn between essentially similar items. The models all point to the
same basic factors: substitution costs and direct costs. We should tax
similar things similarly to minimize substitution costs, but not too
much at the expense of direct costs.
4. Further Comments on Applying Optimal Tax Insights to Line
Drawing
The intuitions developed from the models are useful, but the
models are highly stylized and there are several potential problems
with applying the above models directly to the line drawing problem.
This section discusses these problems and gives some (more
informal) thoughts on applying efficiency to line drawing problems
in more realistic settings. To develop the intuitions, this section
turns back to the check-the-box regulations and considers them in
more detail.
taxed at the same rate and the commodity taxed alone. To determine where the
line should be drawn, calculate the optimal rates and the corresponding dead
weight loss in each possible situation and then select the rule with the lowest
dead weight loss. To actually solve the model requires particular demand
functions, which goes beyond the formal model in the appendix. We can,
however, draw conclusions from inspection of the optimal rate structure. Dead
weight loss is likely to be minimized based on the factors indicated above: the
commodity’s own elasticity and whether it is a substitute for something else
(the cross-elasticities). Thus, high elasticity items should not be taxed at a high
rate and similar items should be taxed similarly.
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Recall that the old four factor test treated a business as a
corporation if (i) it was incorporated under state law; (ii) the equity
of the entity was publicly traded; or (iii) the entity had the requisite
number (three) of the four corporate factors. The third element, the
four factors themselves, were easily avoidable and the check-the-box
regulations repealed this element of the test while leaving the public
trading and actual incorporation lines. (I will ignore the actual
incorporation test here and assume that going forward, the effective
line is public trading because of the advent of limited liability
companies which effectively make actual incorporation elective.)
The basic reasoning behind the regulations is consistent with
the models. Assume that publicly traded entities will be treated as
corporations (e.g., General Motors) and entities that are not publicly
traded and that fail all four factors in the four factor test will be
treated as partnerships (e.g., a two person, general partnership).
These are the “fixed”points, the A and the C. The question is how
we treat entities in the middle and we consider as a possible line the
four factor test of old law.
The four factors, it turns out, had close substitutes that did not
result in the corporate tax. It took the market some time to develop
these substitutes, but by the time the check-the-box regulations were
issued, substitutes to the four factors were consistently used because
of their lower tax cost.106 For the same reasons, the four factors were
themselves highly elastic. Both elements from the models point in
the same direction: the four factors should not be taxed differently
than their substitutes, so they should not create corporate status as
their substitutes do not, and they should not be taxed at a high rate,
so again, they should not create corporate status. Using the four
factors to define corporate tax is, under this logic, inefficient. Thus,
the basic logic behind the check-the-box regulations seems plausible.
The first problem with this analysis is that the four factor test
and the check-the-box test are incommensurate, in the sense that
they raise different amounts of revenue. The four factor test may be
less efficient than check-the-box, but it also raises more revenue. As
a general matter, taxes that raise more revenue will have a higher
dead weight loss (recall, dead weight loss increases with the square of
106

See supra note 11.
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the tax rate), so it is not immediately apparent that the above analysis
can be used to condemn the four factor test.
This is a general problem with applying the models to real
decisions. The decision to move a line will often raise or lower tax
revenues, and we do not know what offsetting tax law change will
be made to keep total revenues constant. For example, changing the
border between debt and equity would change the size of the
corporate tax base. If the change reduces tax revenues, some other,
unknown tax will have to be increased. Additional taxes might be
imposed on almost anything to pay for the tax change. Congress
could, for example, increase the gasoline tax change the foreign tax
credit rules, or lower the child care credit. It is difficult to determine
whether a given change is efficient without knowing where the
offsetting changes are to be made (and the change in dead weight
loss from the offsetting changes).
The models did not have this problem because they automatically
adjusted the rates to raise a constant amount of tax revenue. In the
Corlett and Hague model, if the tax on one commodity was
decreased, a corresponding increase in the tax on the other
commodity was required. In the three commodity, two tax model, if
B was taxed like C, the rates were set optimally given that constraint
and the revenue constraint. If taxing B like C meant that rates had
to be raised (above the rate that C would optimally be taxed at if B
were independent), the model adjusted the rates and added in the
additional dead weight loss. The optimal conditions minimized dead
weight loss subject to this feed-back mechanism.107
Without knowing where the offsetting revenue change is to be
made, it is difficult to determine whether a tax law change is
efficient. To solve this problem we need a universal measure of the
efficiency of a tax.108 Then, at least on a rough basis we can assume
that a change to a line is appropriate if the new line has an efficiency
cost that is better than the median efficiency of the system.
107

In the Auerbach model, the government was allowed to impose nondistorting lump sum taxation, which was adjusted to offset the effect of the
distorting tax imposed on the commodity.
108 Alternatively, we could consider only revenue neutral “packages” of tax
law changes. This is in a loose sense required under current law. See Elizabeth
Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax
Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1998).
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Eliminating a tax with a high efficiency cost is likely to be an
improvement even if we do not know where the offsetting revenue
will be found because, if the tax that raises the offsetting revenue is
no worse than the median tax, then the combined change is an
improvement. Thus, if the four factor test has a higher efficiency
cost than most other sources of revenue, we can conclude that it
should be abandoned.
The simplest measure of the efficiency cost of a tax, known as
the marginal efficiency cost of funds or MECF, is the change in
burden on taxpayers (the marginal burden) caused by a small change
in tax receipts 109 The lower the MECF, the better the tax. It turns
out that for small tax changes, the MECF can be calculated based
solely on the ratio of the revenue that would be raised from a tax
absent any behavioral distortions to the actual revenue raised.110 This
109

See Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Cost of Taxation and the
Marginal Efficiency Cost of Funds, IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 43., No. 1 (March
1996). The concept of MECF is based on a more generic problem of public
finance. If taxes are to finance pure public goods, then the marginal cost of the
goods must be adjusted for the marginal distortion engender because the funds
for the project must be raised via distortionary taxes. The MECF was
developed to measure this cost. See, e.g., Charles L. Ballard & Don Fullerton,
Distortionary Taxes and the Provision of Public Goods, 6 J. E CON . PERSPECTIVES
117 (1992). The use of the MECF to determine the optimal provision of public
goods has recently been challenged. See Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of
Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 49 N AT’L TAX J. 513 (1996).
The MECF is used here to compare different taxes for the same supply of
public goods and the same degree of redistribution (i.e., the same level of taxes)
and, therefore, is relevant notwithstanding whether it should be used to
determine the level of taxes.
110 We want to calculate the marginal burden of a tax change for a given
change in tax revenue. It is easiest to calculate this using the indirect utility
function V(p, y), which is utility expressed as a function of prices, p, and
income, y. By a theorem known as Roy’s identity (the intuition for which will
be given below),

∂V
= λXi , where λ is the marginal utility of income, pi is
∂pi

the price of commodity i, and Xi is the quantity of commodity i demanded. If
we assume fixed producer prices, then the imposition of a tax will increase
prices by the same amount, so that dpi = dti , so

∂V ∂V
=
= λXi The marginal
∂pi ∂ti

burden on a tax reform will be the change in utility expressed in dollars (i.e.,
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simplification means that the efficiency cost of a tax can be
calculated by reference to the “static” and “dynamic” revenue
estimates, which are readily available for every tax law change
(although they are not routinely computed for regulations). This
means policymakers can be told, in real time, the efficiency costs or
benefits of a tax change.
For example, we can calculate the MECF for the four factor test
based on some simple assumptions.111 Suppose there are ten similar
businesses each of which produces income that, if subject to the
corporate tax, would create $100 of tax liability. In addition, suppose
that under the check-the-box regime, six would be corporations
with no change in behavior and that under the four factor test, all
ten would be corporations. (These numbers are summarized in Table
1.) Taxpayers will change their behavior to avoid corporate status.
Suppose that under the check-the-box regime, one taxpayer arranges
its business to avoid being publicly traded, so that the actual revenue
the change in utility divided by the marginal utility of money, λ). The change
in utility is the total differential of the indirect utility function, so using Roy’s
identity,

MB =

dV
= ∑ Xi dti . Let δi be the change in revenue from a small
λ

change in tax, MRi dti . Substituting δi into the formula for marginal burden,
we get

 X 
MB = ∑  i δ i . The change in marginal burden for a given
 MRi 

change in tax is the amount in the parenthetical, which is the marginal
efficiency cost of funds described in the text.
The key to the statement of MECF is Roy’s identity. The intuition behind
Roy’s identity is as follows. Consider a small increase in the price of a
commodity, say a price increase of $1. How much would a consumer need not
to care about the increase? He would need at most $1 multiplied by the amount
of the commodity consumed, X, because this amount will allow him to consume
the identical bundle of goods as before the increase. He might need less because
good substitutes might be available, but the upper bound on the change i n
(money metric) utility from a small change in price is $X. Consider a small
decrease in price. How much better off is the consumer? At least $1 multiplied
by the amount of the commodity consumed because he can consume the same
bundle and keep that amount. Thus, the lower bound on the change in utility
for a small change in price is $X. The upper bound and lower bound are both
$X, so the change in utility from a change in price of $1
111 I thank Dan Shaviro for suggesting the basics of this example to me.
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collected is $500. Suppose that under the four factor test, four
taxpayers alter their business to avoid corporate status, so the total
revenue is $600.
Assume that the public trading line is the law and we want to
compute the MECF of the additional tax revenue from adding the
four factor test. The MECF is the static revenue change, which is
the increase in tax revenues expected from the rule change assuming
nobody changes their behavior to respond to the rule, divided by the
actual revenue. The increase in revenue absent any rule change is
$500 (assuming the business that avoids the public trading line of
the check-the-box rules would be a corporation under the four factor
test without any further behavior change). The actual revenue from
the rule is $100, so the MECF is $500/$100, or 5. The MECF of
initially imposing the public trading line (i.e., the current check-thebox regime) is $600/$500, or 1.2112
Table 1
Check-the-box

Four Factors

Number of corporations with
no changes in behavior

6

10

Actual number of corporations

5

6

$500

$600

1.2

5

Tax collected
MECF

The cost of funds for the four factor test is higher than for the
check-the box test. This alone does not condemn the four factor
test. But if the cost of funds for other taxes is lower than 5, then the
other taxes should be used instead of the four factor test. It is this
thinking, that the efficiency cost of the additional revenue from the
112

The analysis ignores other distortions caused by imposing the
corporate tax. For example, some of the five businesses that are taxed as
corporations under the check-the-box regime may issue more debt than
otherwise. A more complete analysis would consider all the behavior changes
resulting from a tax law change.
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four factor test is too high, higher than other sources, that underlies
the decision to enact the check-the-box regulations.113
This calculation used the simplified formula, which relies only
on static and dynamic revenue, for determining the MECF. For
large tax law changes, this formula may not reflect the cost.114 The
choice between the check-the-box regulations and the four factors
may be large enough that a direct calculation of burden might be
necessary. Suppose that the cost of avoiding the four factor test is
$30, $60, $80, and $90 for the four taxpayers who avoid it, and over
$100 for the rest (so that they would rather pay the corporate tax
than avoid it).115 Suppose also the one taxpayer who avoids corporate
status under the check-the-box rules was one of these four and its
cost of avoiding check-the-box was $80 and it must spend an
additional $10 to avoid the four factors for a total cost of $90. The
increase burden on taxpayers from the four factor test is $280, which
is the sum of the tax paid by the business that is newly treated as a
corporation and the cost of avoiding corporate status for the rest.
The additional revenue is $100, so each additional $1 of revenue
increases the burden on taxpayers by $2.80. The decision to
eliminate the four factor test is based on whether other sources of
the $100 have a lower burden.
A second problem is that in the formal models we know all of
the relevant information, particularly the starting point form which
we were considering reform. For example, the Corlett and Hague
model starts from uniform taxation and asks whether we can make
an improvement. The Auerbach model starts with an existing
distortion around which we determine the remaining taxes. The
starting point in these cases is critical. If, in the Corlett and Hague
model, the commodity that is a substitute for leisure had a very low
113 Another major factor was simplification. The check-the-box rules are
viewed as a significant simplification over current law. Administrative costs can
readily be incorporated into the MECF. See Slemrod, supra note 108.
114 The reason why is the formula depended on Roy’s identity, which
involved the derivative of the indirect utility function. For a large change i n
prices, Roy’s identity might not hold.
115 The MECF calculation using the static revenue estimate as a measure
of dead weight loss assumed that the dead weight loss of a $100 tax increase
(i.e., becoming subject to the corporate tax created an additional tax liability of
$100 for each taxpayer) was $100.
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tax rate, it might be the case that raising the rate would improve
welfare. That is, we cannot conclude that taxing substitutes more
similarly than under current law makes lines more efficient unless we
make assumptions bout the existing distortions and tax rules. We
cannot state a simple a priori rule. The appropriate direction of
change depends on the starting point for reform.
One must be extremely careful in considering the starting point.
Existing tax law imposes numerous distortions that might alter the
starting point. Some transactions have been developed solely because
of taxes. For example, some have argued that short-against-the-box
transactions, in which a taxpayer holds stock while at the same time
selling the stock short) would not exist absent taxes.116 If we tax this
transaction it will, therefore, cease to exist. We should not, however,
be concerned with this “tax elasticity” because the very existence of
the transaction was due to a pre-existing distortion, the use and
definition of the realization requirement. In the financial world, in
particular, it is difficult to separate “real” transactions that might
occur absent tax distortions, with transactions structured solely or
substantially around the existing tax law. In these cases, we should
not be concerned with the presence or absence of particular
transactional forms. Instead, we should look to see whether taxes
distort or change the ability of taxpayers to achieve their desired risk
and return. Thus, the analysis of the short-against-the-box
transaction should examine the effects of taxing the transaction on
the lock-in effect and the ability of taxpayers to diversify.
A third pitfall is that we cannot simply interpret the models as
suggesting that lines in the tax law should be made harder to avoid.
A line can be too hard to avoid, at least from an efficiency
perspective. The can happen because is there are two components in
the dead weight loss triangles (or marginal dead weight loss
trapezoids): the width (reflecting elasticity) and the height
(reflecting the size of the tax). Taxing a low elasticity item too high
is not optimal. We can think of these dimensions as the number of
taxpayers that shift their behavior (the width) and the social cost
(loss of consumer surplus) for each shift (the height). If a line is too
hard to avoid, there may be few shifts but each shift will have a large
116

See Edward D. Kleinbard, Risky and Riskless Positions in Securities, 71
TAXES 783 (1993).
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cost. Making the line easier to avoid effectively reduces the tax on an
activity by making it cheaper to avoid the tax. This may reduce dead
weight loss even though some additional taxpayers will alter their
behavior.
To make this more concrete, suppose the cost of avoiding the
check-the-box rules for the single taxpayer who does so is $99 but
the cost of avoiding the four factor test for the four taxpayers who do
so is $10 each. Then the total dead weight loss from the four factors
test is less than the dead weight loss from the check-the-box test,
despite allowing more taxpayers to avoid the rule and despite raising
more revenue. The four factor test is more efficient here than checkthe-box. We cannot simply look at how many taxpayers avoid a line.
We must also look at the costs of doing so.
Table 2
Check-the-box

Four Factors

$99

$10

Number of avoiders

1

4

Dead Weight Loss

$99

$40

Revenue

$500

$600

Cost per avoider

The reason why the four factor test is efficient in this example is
that it raises revenue while at the same time allowing those who
avoid the tax to do so at a low cost. The business that is treated as a
corporation has a cost of avoidance that is over $100, while the four
who avoid corporate tax treatment have a cost of avoidance of $10
each, a dramatic shift. It is the extreme differences among taxpayers
that causes this result. The tax raises revenue because the one
business cannot avoid it, but it produces low dead weight loss because
those who can avoid it, do so easily. These facts may be somewhat
unusual. Nevertheless, the basic point remains valid, it is only a
question of how often it will occur.117
117

There are a number of other reasons we should be cautious about
applying the simplified models to real world problems. For example, the
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These last two considerations (knowing the starting point and
easy or hard to avoid lines), might be viewed together as second-best
problems, and may be a cause of despair.118 One is forced between
the Scylla of simple generalizations that are sometimes wrong and
the Charybdis of an approach that is too complex to apply.
Nevertheless, if these are the relevant variables, designing a good tax
system requires them to be taken into account, at least implicitly and,
even if it is hard, it can be done. Academics have the time to study
these problems and can recommend solutions based on relevant
empirical data.
In addition, we can develop some rules of thumb for real-time
analysis by policymakers, rules that while not always correct, are
likely in general to point in the right direction. First, the intuition
from the models that we be concerned about substitution costs and
direct costs is generally correct. The underlying intuition behind the
check-the-box rules is well supported. Second, the MECF is a useful
policy guide and is relatively easy to compute. Lines with high
MECF’s are unlikely to be optimal, as common sense might tell you.
Lines with low MECF’s are more promising. Third, to think about
pre-existing distortions, such as the existence of tax motivated
transactions, we should focus on the underlying consumption or
savings decisions, rather than the transactions themselves. Even
these decisions will have pre-existing distortions, but focusing on
them avoids the traps of focusing on transactional form.
conclusions of optimal commodity tax model change in the presence of an
income tax. See Atkinson & Stiglitz, supra note 86 at __. Similarly, the
assumption of fixed producer prices may be unrealistic. The models should be
taken merely as ways to clarify thinking and develop intuitions about the
efficiency effects of line drawing. Ultimately, any decision regarding a
particular line must involve careful thinking about the consequences of the
particular decision in light of the relevant facts.
118 See for example, Charles Mclure, Jr., & George Zodrow, The Study
and Practice of Income Tax Policy, in MODERN PUBLIC FINANCE, 205 (John M.
Quigley and Eugene Smolensky eds. 1994); Robert Haveman, Optimal
Taxation and Public Policy, id. at 247 (“because of the limitations of optimal
income tax theory, policymakers should treat all policy inferences derived from
it with circumspection.); Joel Slemrod, Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax
Systems, 4 J. E CON . PERSPECTIVES 157 (1990); Angus Deaton, Econometric
Issues for Tax Design in Developing Countries, in Theory of Taxation for
Developing Countries 92-113 (David Newbery & Nicholas Stern, eds. 1987).
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This is the type of thinking that goes on at a gut level in tax
policymaking every day. It is, for example, consistent with the stated
rationale for many tax law changes.119 Formalizing the intuitions
and making them legitimate concern for tax policy can only help the
decision makers. Section III below gives some examples of the type
of analysis one might use to show that it can be done.
5. Summary
The efficiency analysis given here is only a start. The models
need to be refined substantially to be more useful, and application of
any models in particular contexts will require substantial
information. Nevertheless, the analysis shows that line drawing can
be analyzed from an efficiency perspective and that the analysis may
be consistent with the common-sense analysis already used by
policymakers.
B. Efficiency is the Appropriate Criterion
This previous section showed that it is possible to evaluate line
drawing problems by their efficiency. This section argues that
evaluating line drawing problems by their efficiency both is
appropriate and should be the primary method of analysis. In
particular, distributional considerations should be secondary to
efficiency in many cases involving line drawing in the tax law
119

To take an example from recent legislation mentioned elsewhere in the
paper, consider the change the realization rule that requires certain hedging
transactions to be treated as realization events. See section 1259. The rationale
for this change is that the economics of this class of hedges was substantially
identical to that of a sale. Taxpayers could easily avoid sale treatment by using
these transactions. See C ONF . REP. N O . 220, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 512
(1997). In other words, selling and hedging of this sort are close substitutes.
Inevitably, the legislation just moves the line, but one hopes it moved the line
to a place where it is not as easy to substitute transactions.
Another example is the repeal of the so-called General Utilities doctrine.
See supra note 68. In this case, Congress expanded the corporate tax base,
knowing full well that the corporate tax causes economic distortions. The stated
logic was, in part the wort sort of platonic thinking, involving the “integrity”
of the corporate tax base. Nevertheless, the underlying intuition is that the
transactions covered by the General Utilities doctrine were close substitutes for
other, higher taxed transactions and that efficiency was improved by taxing
these transactions alike, notwithstanding the expansion of the corporate tax
base.
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because adjustments to the rate structure can and should be made to
provide the appropriate distribution of the tax burden. If there are
legitimate goals supporting the distinction other than efficiency and
redistribution, line drawing should balance these other goals with
the efficiency costs.
1. Efficiency is an Appropriate Criterion
The argument that efficiency is appropriate for resolving line
drawing problems in the tax law is the same as the argument that
efficiency is an appropriate norm in other areas of law. If we are
concerned with the effect of the law on individuals’ welfare, the
consequences of the law, efficiency provides an important measure of
the effect. This ground is well-trodden and is not worth going over
again.120 Two comments should be made, however.
First, the arguments in favor of efficiency apply directly to line
drawing. Where a line is drawn affects welfare and should be
evaluated by the consequences. This is true even is one is constrained
to leaving many arbitrary rules in place. Welfare should be
maximized within the constraints. Professor Levmore is wrong that
the existence of immutable arbitrary lines in the corporate tax means
one cannot make normative arguments about that area.121
Second, many of the objections to efficiency made elsewhere
have less weight when applied to line drawing in the tax law. In
particular, concerns for rights of individuals or concerns regarding
personal liberty are generally less present here than in other areas of
120

The literature is vast. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER , ECONOMIC
A NALYSIS OF L AW (3d ed. 1986); ROBERT C OOTER & T HOMAS ULEN ,
L AW AND E CONOMICS (1988); M ARK K ELMAN, A G UIDE TO C RITICAL
L EGAL S TUDIES, chs 4-5 (1987); A. M ITCHELL POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO L AW AND E CONOMICS (2d ed. 1989); JULES L.
COLEMAN, MARKETS , MORALS AND THE LAW (1988).
121 See Levmore, supra note 45. Similarly, Fred Schauer treats the legal
resolution of Sorites-type legal problems as one of merely drawing an arbitrary
line. See Schauer, supra note 6. Professor Schauer uses the example of the
decision that the smallest constitutional size of a criminal jury is six members
and suggests that the decision is arbitrary. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223
(1978). (More precisely, he states that there might be good arguments for
determining a range of answers, choosing within that range is arbitrary. See id
at note 51.) In virtually all cases, however, drawing the line will have
consequences and decisions should be made in light of the consequences.
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law. For example, it is difficult to conceive of liberty concerns in
whether a particular instrument should be classified as debt or equity.
Similarly, efficiency has been criticized because it assumes that
preferences are exogenous and reasonably well defined (and wellbehaved in the sense that they are transitive, continuous, etc). Tax
laws unlike, say, the criminal law, however, are not likely to have a
major effect on preferences, so an assumption that preferences are
exogenous is more reasonable. Thus, it is difficult to see how the
distinction between debt and equity affects preferences
significantly.122 Therefore, the line drawing problem can, and
should, be analyzed by direct reference to efficiency.
2. Distributional Considerations
The argument for efficiency, as noted above, is that the
consequences of rules matter. Analytically, however, it is difficult to
separate efficiency from other consequences of a given rule. A
welfarist aggregates the welfare of individuals in the society and
evaluates rules based on whether they improve welfare.
Maximization does not involve separate maximization of efficiency
and of other considerations, such as the distribution of wealth.
Nevertheless, the suggestion made here is that efficiency alone
should be the primary criterion for evaluating line drawing problem.
Consider a change to a line in the tax law and a simultaneous
adjustment to the tax rates such that the change is distributionally
neutral. If the change in the line improves efficiency, then the
combination of the line change and the distributional adjustment is
a Pareto improvement. Everyone can be made better off.123
122 This does not mean that tax law does not change behavior. It clearly
does so. Attention to these behavior changes is one of the goals of this paper.
But changing behavior by changing relative prices is not the same as changing
preferences. For example, where the tax law intentionally changes behavior,
such as through a subsidy or tax preference, it is not usually the case that the
tax law is intended to change preferences. This is not to say that tax laws never
affect preferences. Some social policy may be purposefully designed to change
preferences, but this is the exception.
123 Note that in most cases, an efficiency analysis of line drawing will
produce identical results even if, during the analysis, distributional
considerations are ignored. The reason why is that the rate adjustments
necessary to keep the system distributionally neutral will often not affect the
efficiency analysis. This will be true for all changes that do not affect items that
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Moreover, achieving redistribution through line drawing will, as
a general matter, produce worse results than the procedure just
outlined—drawing efficient lines and adjusting the rate. The
analysis is based on the argument Professors Kaplow and Shavell
made that the tax system is more efficient than the legal system in
redistributing. Compare two policies that create equal distributions
of wealth or income. The first achieves redistribution by imposing
an inefficient tort rule, say one in which the damages vary by the
relative wealth of the plaintiff and defendant. The second imposes
the efficient tort rule but changes the marginal rate structure of the
income tax. The regime with the inefficient tort rule imposes two
costs: the increased cost of accidents because the tort rule is
inefficient and the dead weight loss caused by redistributive taxation.
The regime with the change to the marginal rate structure imposes
the same dead weight loss from redistribution but does so without
increasing the cost of accidents. By focusing redistributive policies in
the tax system, everyone can be made better off.124
This argument can be translated into the shape of the tax base
itself. Simply substitute the “tax base” for “tort law.” If the scope of
tax base is used for redistributive purposes, then the double
inefficiency identified by Kaplow and Shavell occurs. Thus, the tax
base should be defined as efficiently as possible and the rate structure
should be used for redistribution.
This arguments suggest that everyone can be made better off
through efficient changes to lines in the tax law and that one can
are uniquely good or uniquely bad for redistribution. For example, consider a
change to the line between debt and equity and suppose that both types of
instruments are held exclusively by the wealthy. If the change loses revenue,
then, to be distributionally neutral, additional taxes will have to be raised on
the rich. But whether the change is efficient or not is unlikely to be effected by
the simultaneous increase in tax rates.
124 In addition, as Professor Bittker noted, inefficiency tends to drive out
inequity. See Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do
Misallocations Drive Out Inequities, in THE E CONOMICS OF TAXATION
(Henry J. Aaron & Michael Boskin, eds. 1980).The reason is that different
treatment of different transactions, which may at first appear to be inequitable,
will lead to price changes so that the return to all investments is approximately
the same (adjusted for risk). The price adjustments create inefficiency, but the
inequity is eliminated. Moreover, taxpayers can eliminate the distributional
effect of differential taxation by holding diversified portfolios.
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often identify these changes without explicit reference to
distributional considerations. One might, for example, establish a
procedure in which overall tax rates are adjusted for distributional
considerations on a regular basis. This type of regular adjustment
would allow policymakers to focus on efficiency considerations in
other areas.125
There are three caveats to this argument. First, it may not be
possible to make rate adjustments so that the effect of moving a line
is distributionally neutral. For example, many lines in the tax law
affect the distribution of income between men and women. It will
not always be possible to adjust the rates to eliminate the effect of
changing a line that has this effect. In these cases, the analysis must
incorporate both distributional and efficiency effects.
Second, the argument assumes that the only efficiency effect of
altering the tax rates to achieve more redistribution is directly related
to the redistribution. Changing a legal rule to achieve redistribution
causes efficiency losses both through the redistribution (i.e.,
responses in labor supply to the decreased return to work) and
through the inefficient legal rule, while changing the tax system
only causes efficiency losses from the redistribution. If, however, the
tax base is poorly defined, altering the rate structure may cause other
distortions. For example, if fringe benefits are not taxed for
administrative reasons, increases the progressivity of the tax system
may increase distortions in the forms of compensation which may
not be present when using some other method of redistribution.
Third, it may not be possible to achieve every potentially desirable
degree of redistribution with every tax base. For example, a tax only
on wages may not tax the very wealthy at all regardless of the tax rate
because they may not have wages, living instead off of only capital
income. Thus, in extreme cases, where the line drawing problem
would significantly change the scope of the tax base, we might need
to consider our ability to achieve appropriate redistributive effects
solely through the rate structure.
125

In fact, it Congress’ perceived the lack of ability to adjust tax rates that
has put so much pressure on the distributional considerations of every change
in the tax law. See Michael Graetz, Distribution Tables, Tax Legislation, and the
Illusion of Precision, in D ISTRIBUTIONAL A NALYSIS OF TAX P OLICY (David
Bradford, ed. 1995); and Michael Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Tax Lawmaking,
95 COLUMBIA L. REV. 609 (1995) for a discussion of these pressures.
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Despite these caveats, the rule that we should primarily be
concerned with the efficiency effects of line drawing and focus
redistributional concerns on the rate structure remains generally
valid. Thus, absent some other consideration or a special
circumstance, the primary goal for line drawing is to make the lines
as efficient as possible.
3. Other Goals
There may sometimes be specific goals or norms underlying a
given distinction in the tax law and these goals should have an effect
on the where lines are drawn.126 For example, the tax law may
prohibit deductions for bribes because we want to discourage this
activity. In most cases, these goals are insufficient to determine
where lines should be drawn. The base cases are easy and the task for
the policy maker is to decide where the line should be drawn outside
of the base cases, where the underlying goal is weaker. In these cases,
the appropriate line should incorporate both the underlying goal and
the efficiency costs of meeting that goal. The analysis above, that
line drawing will cause shifts in behavior and efficiency losses is still
relevant but the costs of these shifts must be balanced against the
other goals being pursued.
For example, Congress recently denied deductions for lobbying
expenses. The reason for the denial is unclear in the legislative
history, but it must involve a view about the effect of money on
political decision making. It is relatively easy to identify some activity
as lobbying, but outside of that activity, the question of what is
lobbying quickly becomes murky. All speech that takes an opinion
and that might influence political decisions is, conceivably, lobbying.
In deciding where to draw the line, one must take into account the
goals of the rule and the costs of the rule (in this case, both
efficiency costs and other costs).
4. Summary
This section demonstrated that line drawing problems can be
analyzed in a principled fashion by direct reference to the efficiency
of the competing rules. This is true regardless of how arbitrary or
126 I do not take a position on the extent to which these goals should
themselves reflect efficiency or the distribution of wealth. The argument in the
text assumes that in some cases, other goals are appropriate.
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how bad the underlying distinction is. For example, most scholars
may believe that the distinction between debt and equity produces
large distortions in capital structures of corporations, but the
distinction can, and should, be made to minimize the costs. The
argument for this type of analysis is that the consequences of tax
rules matter. Efficiency should be the primary determinant of line
drawing because redistributional goals are best addressed through the
rate structure. Other social goals that are implemented through the
tax law should be included to the extent relevant to the decision.
III. Examples of Efficient Line Drawing
This section considers some examples of the theories proposed in
Section II. The goal is to illustrate the recommended approach
rather than provide definitive answers to these problems. In
particular, empirical research is needed to determine the appropriate
answers and this section includes only (what I hope are plausible)
assumptions.
The check-the-box regulations, of course, provide a ready
example. As illustrated in Section II above, under plausible
assumptions, the check-the-box regulations are efficient. That is,
the four factor test had a high marginal efficiency cost of funds and
replacements for the revenue raised by the four factor can readily be
found. Thus, it was appropriate to move the line between
corporations and partnerships to public trading, as was done in the
check-the-box regulations.
There are two examples in the academic literature of the type of
analysis recommended here. Professor Shaviro examined the
realization doctrine from an efficiency perspective in a recent article
in the Tax Law Review.127 Shaviro considers potentially offsetting
effects of the realization rule. A broad rule means that investments
will be more evenly subject to realization, reducing the disparity in
tax rates between assets and, therefore, reducing disparities with
respect to the taxpayer’s initial decision to invest. But a realization
rule will increase the lock-in effect and a broad rule will increase it
more than a narrow rule. Shaviro then applies this analysis to a

127

See Shaviro, supra note 5.
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number of different transactions that are, or should be, controversial
under the realization rule.128
In addition, in an article in the National Tax Journal I discussed
whether we should tax a short-against-the-box as a realization
event.129 The decision to do so depends on the efficiency benefits,
not whether the transaction looks like a sale. The major efficiency
cost of the realization rule is the harm from the lock-in effect.
Taxing shorts-against-the-box increases the cost of holding stock
because tax-free hedging will be more difficult. This will cause some
people to sell who otherwise might have held, but it will increase the
cost for those who continue to sell. As is familiar from the analysis
in Section II, fewer taxpayers will avoid the rule but those who do
will have a higher cost. The net effect will depend on magnitudes.
The article then considers the administrative costs of the rule and
concludes that these costs are sufficiently high that the probably
swamp any efficiency benefit.
The other line drawing problem discussed in Sections I and II is
the distinction between debt and equity. As noted above, taxpayers
and their advisors have been innovative in this area recently, and a
number of new securities push the boundary beyond its previous
limits, including MIPS, or Monthly Income Preferred Stock.
MIPS are an almost perfect substitute for preferred stock but, most
tax advisors believe, MIPS are debt for tax purposes, and issuers of
MIPS are entitled to a tax deduction for interest payments to the
holders. Because they are a close economic substitute with a lower
tax cost, MIPS have essentially replaced preferred stock.130 The
question is whether the government should classify MIPS as stock
or debt. The Treasury Department thought so and proposed
legislation to this effect. The proposal was rejected by Congress.
At first glance, treating MIPS as debt appears to be efficient. If
it is a perfect substitute for preferred stock (it is not quite a perfect
substitute, but it is close), there is no economic cost in terms of
128

Shaviro’s analysis is consistent with the spirit of the suggestions made
here, but many of the details are different. I do not endorse or criticize any of
his suggestions here. Instead his analysis is used as an example of the type of
inquiry that should be done.
129 See Weisbach, supra note 41. See supra text accompanying note 41 for
a discussion of the short- against-the-box transaction.
130 See Flaherty letter, supra note 51.
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optimal capital structures to switching to MIPS, and it reduces an
inefficient tax, the corporate tax. This is in contrast to concerns
about tax-induced over-leveraging in the 1980's. Creating interest
deductions then involved using high-yield “junk” debt, which
potentially imposed bankruptcy costs on the company. If MIPS is a
perfect preferred stock substitute, it imposes no such costs.
The question, however, is somewhat more complicated. There
are three pieces to the analysis. First, it is not necessarily true that
preferred stock should be treated as debt (which is the effective result
of MIPS) if dividends on common stock will not be. That is, it is
not necessarily true that the appropriate dividing line between equity
and debt is at preferred stock. We cannot simply say that any
reduction in the corporate tax is good. Second, even if it is
appropriate to treat preferred stock as debt, allowing MIPS to be
treated as debt and preferred stock to be treated as equity gives
taxpayers an election for the treatment of their investments and it is
not clear that electivity is appropriate. Third, if MIPS is not a
perfect substitute for preferred stock and we assume for the moment
that preferred stock is treated as equity, it may not be appropriate to
treat MIPS as debt because the shifting from preferred stock to
MIPS will impose some inefficiencies. Consider each issue in turn.
First, there are good arguments that preferred stock should be
treated as debt using the analysis outlined in Part II above. The
“fixed points,” the A and the C, are (1) common stock must be
treated as equity, with no deduction for dividends, and (2) most
instruments today treated as debt will continue to be treated as debt,
with a deduction for interest. The question is whether preferred
stock, the B, should be treated as debt or as equity. To make this
determination, we must determine the substitution costs (whether
preferred stock is a better substitute for debt or for equity) and the
direct costs (whether standing alone, an investment with preferred
stock characteristics is better treated as equity or debt).
Preferred stock, of course, comes in a variety of different flavors,
and the analysis will be different for each. But consider the preferred
stock that MIPS replaced. These preferred stocks have a fixed
dividend rate (generally payable at the discretion of the board of
directors but cumulative), a long term (that is either fixed, perpetual,
or callable at the end of the term by the issuer), no right to vote
(other than for certain limited purposes) and deep subordination.
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Debt instruments can have terms similar to these, but most will lack
some of these features. For example, if a debt instrument is deeply
subordinated, it will have a shorter term.131 Common stock will have
some similar features but many differences, including participation in
the profits of the company and the right to vote. While one would
need to perform empirical work to confirm this, my belief is that
preferred stock is a better substitute for debt than for equity and,
therefore, the substitution costs are reduced if preferred stock is
treated as debt.132
Moreover, treating preferred stock as debt is likely to reduce the
direct costs because the rules for debt taxation, including the
deduction for the issuer, are thought to better reflect income (or to
be more consistent with the rest of the tax law) than the double
taxation imposed by equity taxation. Thus, both factors points in the
same direction—preferred stock should be treated as debt for tax
purposes.
Second, we must consider whether MIPS should be treated as
debt if preferred stock (in its traditional form) must remain as equity.
It was not likely the case that the policymakers believed they had
discretion to rethink the taxation of preferred stock, even if they
believed the above analysis that preferred stock should be treated as
debt. Allowing MIPS to be treated as debt in this case means that
taxpayers can choose their treatment for the investment, using the
MIPS form if they desire debt treatment and the preferred stock
form if they desire equity treatment.133 Electivity has benefits
131

The terms on MIPS are as close as an instrument typically can get to
preferred stock and still obtain a tax opinion that it is debt. The major
difference is that on default on a MIPS, typical debt rights obtain, so that the
holders can force the company into bankruptcy, while “default” on a preferred
stock typically allows the holders to elect directors.
132 There are surprisingly few studies of the cross-elasticity of debt and
equity, given the important of this factor for measuring the efficiency costs of
the corporate tax. See JANE G. G RAVELLE , THE E CONOMIC EFFECTS OF
T AXING C APITAL INCOME 82-84 (199_)and the sources cited therein.
Textbooks on corporate finance treat preferred stock as if it is a debt substitute.
See, e.g., RICHARD A BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS , PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 360-61 (5th ed 1996).
133 Notwithstanding the interest deduction given debt, structuring an
investment as stock is sometimes preferable from a purely tax perspective. For
example, if the marginal investor is a corporation, then the yield on the
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because it allows taxpayers to choose debt treatment for the
investment, which we have already decided is generally appropriate.
The cost of electivity is that the effective tax on the investment is
lower than if a single treatment were chosen. Electivity will make
the tax on this investment (MIPS/Preferred stock) too low, so the
choice is between too low a tax (elective treatment) and too high a
tax (treatment as equity). Which is worse depends on the
magnitudes, but my guess is that treatment as equity is worse.
Third, suppose that MIPS and preferred stock are not perfect
substitutes. There will be direct costs and substitution costs. The
direct costs of taxing MIPS as equity are higher than for taxing
MIPS as debt.
The substitution analysis is more complex. It will depend on the
number of taxpayers who switch and the cost per taxpayer. If MIPS
is treated as debt, large numbers of taxpayers switch, but the cost of
negligible for each. If MIPS were treated as equity, then, depending
on the next best substitute, fewer taxpayers will switch, but the cost
will be higher per taxpayer. My suspicion is that MIPS is a close
enough substitute for preferred stock that the substitution costs are
low and that moving the line would not reduce these costs
significantly, if at all. That is, the cost of funds for expanding the
equity line in this direction is high. This is why the Treasury
proposal to tax MIPS as equity raised so little money.134 If the
efficiency costs of substitution from treating MIPS as debt are about
the same or lower than treating it as equity, then the analysis is easy.
Both factors point in the same direction as the direct costs of
treating MIPS as debt are lower than treating it as equity. If treating
investment might be lower because corporations receive a dividends received
deduction. See I.R.C. § 243 (dividends received deduction). Depending on the
ability of the issuer to use interest deductions, the overall tax on the investment
might be lower structured as equity.
134 For example, the marginal efficiency cost of funds for the Treasury
proposal was high. The proposal was projected to raise at most $189 million
over five years (the estimate includes the MIPS proposal and several other
debt/equity proposals and is not broken down separately). The estimate
determined without behavioral changes would have been many, many times
higher. In 1995 alone, $10.7 billion of MIPS were issued. See Flaherty letter,
supra note 51. The assumption behind the estimates must have been that the
line proposed by the Treasury Department was not significantly less elastic
than current law (if at all).
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MIPS as equity lowered the dead weight loss from substitutions,
then the two factors offset one another.
Overall, my suspicion is that it is efficient to treat MIPS as debt
and Congress was correct in rejecting the Treasury proposal. This
analysis is not based at all on traditional criteria for distinguishing
between debt and equity. Instead, it is based on whether treating
MIPS as debt is more efficient. Empirical analysis is necessary to
confirm (or reject) this analysis. The goal here is merely to give an
example of the type of analysis that should be done.
This section shows that efficiency analysis can be done by
policymakers. While the analysis is not simple and while it requires
information, it should be well within the reach of tax policymakers.
IV. Conclusion
This paper provided an analysis of line drawing in the tax law.
Basic motivating examples include the line between partnerships and
corporations, between debt and equity, between selling and holding.
Line drawing is ubiquitous in the tax law. Where it draws lines, the
tax law treats similar activities differently, and distinguishing
between them is problematic.
The paper argues that traditional analysis of the tax law,
including using the platonic meaning of the terms or looking to the
Haig-Simons definition of income, ability to pay, or some other
traditional tax norm is not helpful for line drawing. As a result,
substantial and difficult problems in the tax law have not been
adequately analyzed. For example, although the line between debt
and equity in part determines the corporate tax base, few articles
analyze the line. The corporate tax raises over $100 billion in tax
revenue each year and is thought to impose significant distortions on
the economy. The appropriate line between debt and equity can
significantly affect these costs.
The major argument of this paper is that where lines are drawn
has welfare consequences and lines should be drawn where the
consequences are most desirable. In particular, line drawing will have
efficiency effects. This paper identifies some of the factors that will
determine how lines can be drawn most efficiently. The most
important factors are whether the line keeps close substitutes
together and whether transactions are taxed appropriately when
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considered by themselves (i.e., without regard to line drawing). For
example, close substitutes for equity should be taxed like equity and
close substitutes for debt should be taxed like debt. We should,
however, be somewhat more expansive on the debt side because
generally debt taxation will lead to fewer distortions. The models
used to develop the intuition need refinement and further work
should be done both to identify general efficiency conditions. In
addition, each particular line will involve features that make the
analysis complex because of second-best considerations.
Appendix A
List of Some Important Lines in the Tax Law
1. Debt/equity
Debt is treated differently than equity because payments on debt
(interest) are deductible while similar payments on equity
(dividends) are not.
2. Holding/selling
Income is not taxed until it is realized, which generally means when
the asset producing the income is sold. Thus, the tax law treated
holding and selling as asset differently.
3. Independent contractor/employee
Payments for services from independent contractors are not subject
to withholding taxes while similar payments to employees are.
Independent contractors are also subject to fewer restrictions on
the deduction of work-related expenses. See, for example, I.R.C.
§67, imposing a 2% floor on unreimbursed business expenses of
employees.
4. Consumption/business/investment
Expenses for consumption are not deductible (and do not create
basis) but expenses for business or investment are recovered for
tax purposes either through an immediate deduction or basis.
5. Market/imputed income
Wealth created through market transactions is generally taxable
while self-produced wealth or wealth produced from the holding
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of durable consumption assets is not. For example, the wealth
created through ownership of a home (known as imputed rent)
is untaxed while the wealth created through the rental of a home
is taxed.

6. Corporation/partnership
Corporations are subject to a two-tier tax while partnerships are
subject to only a single tax (at the owner level).
7. Capital gain/ordinary income
Capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than ordinary income.
8. Foreign source/U.S. source
Income from foreign sources is taxed differently in a variety of ways
than income from U.S. sources. For example, foreigners may
only be taxed by the U.S. government on U.S. source income.
Allowances for foreign tax credits for U.S. taxpayers are
determined in part by the amount of foreign source income.
9. Related/unrelated
Relatedness matters for a variety of purposes in the tax law. For
example, losses are not allowed if they are from a sale of an asset
to a related party. Corporations must have very specific
relationships to be eligible to file consolidated returns.
10. Recognition/nonrecognition
Certain transactions that are realization events do not produce gain
or loss for tax purposes because they are treated as
“nonrecognition” events. Other similar transactions are not
nonrecognition events. For example, the exchange of real estate
in Kansas for real estate in New York City can qualify as a
nonrecognition event (see I.R.C. §1031) but the exchange of
IBM stock for Microsoft stock generally will not.
Appendix B
Two-Tax, Three Commodity Model
To model the line drawing problem, we modify the standard
optimal commodity tax problem so that there are fewer taxes than

CHICAGO WORKING PAPER IN LAW AND ECONOMICS

70

commodities. In particular, the three commodity case with two taxes
is relevant. We assume that the tax on goods 1 and 3 can vary
independently, and we must decide whether good 2 should be taxed
the same as good 1 or good 3. Essentially, we must define good 2 as
part of good 1 or part of good 3, effectively drawing a legal
definition. The model sets the tax optimally to minimize deadweight
loss given the revenue constraint and the constraint that there are
only two tax rates.
We begin with the partial equilibrium case (in which cross-price
elasticities are assumed to be zero) to get an intuition for the results,
but it is necessary to examine the general equilibrium case because
the cross-price elasticities are relevant.
Both models involve a single consumer economy and, therefore,
need not aggregate utilities. The reasons for using a single consumer
economy are discussed in the text. Both models also assume that the
supply is perfectly elastic.
1. Partial Equilibrium Case
The standard formula for dead weight loss in a partial
equilibrium setting is L(t ) = 1 2 ∑ ε i pi qi ti2 where εi is the
i

compensated price elasticity of commodity i, pi is the price of the
commodity, qi is the quantity, and ti is the unit tax on the
commodity. For the intuition behind this formula, see, Harvey S.
Rosen, Public Finance, (4th ed. 1995). The partial equilibrium
assumption is that cross-elasticities of demand are zero, elasticities of
supply are infinite and the demand curve is linear within the relevant
range. The revenue raised from a set of taxes is ∑ pi qi ti = R . To
i

simplify notation, let piqi = Pi.
We want to minimize loss from the tax, subject to a revenue
constraint, R. Form the Lagrangian,


H = 1 2 ∑ ε i Pti i2 + λ  ∑ Pti i − R
(1)
 i

i
The first order conditions are:
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∂H
= ε i Pti i + λPi = 0
∂ti

(2)

λ
.
εi
Suppose the number of commodities, i, is 3 and t1 = t2 . Call the
combined tax rate t12. The Lagrangian is:
Solving for ti produces the familiar Ramsey formula, ti =

H = 1 2 (t122 (ε1 P1 + ε 2 P2 ) + t32ε 3 P3 ) + λ (t12 ( P1 + P2 ) + t3 P3 − R)

(3)

The first order conditions are:

∂H
= ε1 Pt
1 12 + ε 2 P2 t12 + λ ( P1 + P2 ) = 0
∂t12
∂H
= ε 3 P3t3 + λP3 = 0
∂t3
Thus,
ε P +ε P 
ε 3t3 = t12  1 1 2 2  = λ
 P1 + P2 

(4)

(5)

Note that t3 remains inverse to ε3 , but t12 is inverse to the
weighted average of ε1 and ε2.
ε P + ε 2 P2
Let 1 1
= ε12 and P1 + P2 = P12 (These are effectively the
P1 + P2
weighted elasticity and size of the market for combined
“commodity.”) We can then express the first order conditions as

ε12 t12 = ε 3t3 = λ

(6)

which is similar to the standard Ramsey formula. The solution is
similar for the case where t2 = t3 .
To determine whether it is efficient for good 2 to be taxed like
good 1 or like good 3, we must solve for dead weight loss for each
grouping and compare. Staying with the case where t1 = t2 , we solve
for the dead weight loss:
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(ε1P1 + ε 2 P2 )ε 3
2
ε 3 ( P1 + P2 ) + (ε1 P1 + ε 2 P2 ) P3

(7)

L12 = 1 2 R2

This can be expressed more simply if we let δ12 =

P12 P3
+
Then
ε12 ε 3

the expression for dead weight loss reduces to:
 1 
L12 = 1 2 R2  
 δ12 

(8)

If alternatively, t2 = t3 , then we get the equivalent formulas
(using similar notation):
 1 
L23 = 1 2 R2   , and
 δ 23 
L23 = 1 2 R2

(9)

ε1 (ε 2 P2 + ε 3 P3 )

ε1 ( P2 + P3 ) + (ε 2 P2 + ε 3 P3 ) P1
2

We want to find the values of ε2 for which L12 < L23. To
simplify the expression, let all the P i = 1. Then, setting the
expressions for dead weight loss equal and solving for ε2 , we get:

(

ε 2 = − 1 2 ε1 + ε 3 ± ε12 + ε 32 + 14ε1ε 3

)

(10)

Because elasticities must be negative, there is only a single
solution to this equation. (The expression in the square root will be
larger than (ε1 + ε3 )2 , so the value of the square root will be larger
than the value of the sum of the first two terms, ε1 + ε3 , so the only
valid solution will be the case where the square root is added to the
other elasticities.) Because there are no other solutions, by
determining whether ε2 is greater than or less than the expression
determines whether commodity 2 should be grouped with
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commodity 1 or commodity 3. (Which way the inequality cuts will
depend on whether ε1 is greater than or less than ε3 .)
The obvious question is why the dividing point is not half way
between the elasticities. That is, the intuition might have been that
it is best to group the commodities whose elasticities are closest. This
intuition is not correct. The reason why is that the cost of deviating
from the optimal tax for a commodity with a high elasticity is higher
than the cost of deviating from the optimal tax for a commodity
with a low elasticity. This can be seen by determining the marginal
dead weight loss with respect to each tax. Thus, the dividing line
will be skewed toward the commodity with higher elasticity:
commodity 2 should be grouped with the higher elasticity
commodity only if its elasticity is somewhat closer to the higher
elasticity than the lower elasticity.
2. General Equilibrium Case
The general equilibrium model is based on Tresch, chapter 15,
and equations (11) through (21) simply repeat the model in Tresch
for convenience of the reader. The model uses the consumer
expenditure function rather than the usual indirect utility function
(see, e.g., Atkinson & Stiglitz, Chapter 12). The measure of loss is
the Hicks compensating variation, which is the difference between
the amount of income needed to be given lump sum to the
consumer to make the consumer indifferent to taxation and the tax
revenue raised. We assume linear technology which will mean fixed
producer prices equal to the constant marginal cost and output is
perfectly elastic.
r
r
Let M (q, U °) be the consumer expenditure function with q the
vector of prices qi and utility U°. Then,
r
M = ∑ qi Xi (q, U °)

(11)

i

r
where Xi (q, U °) is the compensated demand curve for commodity i.
M gives the lump sum income needed to give an individual utility
of U°.
Note that from standard consumer theory:
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∂M
= Xk , and
∂qk
(12)

∂M
= Skj .
∂qk ∂q j
The Skj are the Slutsky substitution terms.
The tax revenue collected is
r
R = ∑ ti Xi (q, U °)

(13)

i

where ti is the unit
r tax on commodity i.
Impose a tax t . Then because of the assumption of linear
technology, qi = pi + ti, where pi is the producer price for commodity
i. Define the measure of loss L from a tax as the difference between
M and the tax revenue:
L = M − R = ∑ qi Xi (qi , U °) − ∑ ti Xi (qi , U °)
i

(14)

i

Note that this is the Hicks compensating variation measure of
loss because M is evaluated at after-tax prices, qi, and is the amount
of income needed to keep the consumer at pre-tax utility, U°, with
those prices.
The marginal loss from a small change in a tax is:

∂L ∂M
=
−
∂tk ∂tk

∂ ∑ ti Xi
i

∂tk

(15)

Because of linear technology, dqk = dtk . That is, in the kth
market, when tk is introduced, the price qk will increase by tk . In
addition, in the ith market, qi will not change with the introduction
of tk because neither pi nor ti can change.
Therefore,
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∂M
∂M ∂qi ∂M
=∑
=
= Xk
∂tk
∂qk
i ∂qi ∂tk
∂ ∑ ti Xi
i

∂tk

= ∑ Xi
i

∂ti
∂X
∂X
+ ∑ ti i = Xk + ∑ ti i
∂tk
∂tk
∂tk
i
i

∂Xi
∂X ∂q
∂X
= ∑ i j = i = Sik
∂tk
∂qk
j ∂q j ∂tk

(16)

(17)

(18)

Therefore,

∂L
= − ∑ ti Sik
∂tk
i

(19)

We want to minimize loss, L. Define the Lagrangian
H = L(t) + (R-R*)

(20)

where R* is the fixed revenue constraint.
Then the first order conditions are,


∂H
= − ∑ ti Sik − λ  Xk + ∑ ti Sik  = 0
∂tk


i
i

∑t S

(21)

λ
=C
1− λ
Xk
producing the well-known “equal percentage change” Ramsey
formula. The fraction is equal to the percentage change in the
demand for Xk in response to a small change in tax rates.
Impose the additional restriction that i = 3 and t1 = t2 , calling the
combined rate t12.
Then
i ik

i

=
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∂M ∂M ∂q1 ∂M ∂q2 ∂M ∂q3
=
+
+
= X1 + X2
∂t12 ∂q1 ∂t12 ∂q2 ∂t12 ∂q3 ∂t12

(22)

∂M
= X3
∂t3

(23)

 ∂X ∂X 
∂R
∂X
= X1 + X2 + t12  1 + 2  + t3 3
∂t12
∂t12
 ∂t12 ∂t12 
 ∂X ∂X 
∂R
∂X
= X3 + t12  1 + 2  + t3 3
∂t3
∂t3 
∂t3
 ∂t3

(24)

In addition:

∂X1
= S11 + S12 ,
∂t12
∂X2
= S12 + S22 , and
∂t12

(25)

∂X3
= S31 + S32 ,
∂t12
Marginal loss from a tax is

∂L
= t12 ( S11 + 2 S12 + S22 ) + t3 ( S31 + S32 ) = α12
∂t12
∂L
= t12 ( S13 + S23 ) + t3 ( S33 ) = α 3
∂t3
The Lagrangian remains:

(26)
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H = L + λ(R-R*)

(27)

The first order conditions are:

∂H
= α12 + λ ( X1 + X2 + α12 ) = 0
∂t1
∂H
= α 3 + λ ( X3 + α 3 ) = 0
∂t3

(28)

Solving, we get:

α12
λ
=
, and
X1 + X2 1 − λ
α3
λ
=
X3 1 − λ

(29)

This can be expressed as:
t12 ( S11 + S21 ) + t12 ( S12 + S22 ) + t3 ( S13 + S23 )
= C, and
X1 + X2
(30)
t12 ( S31 + S32 ) + t3 S33
=C
X3
This has a similar interpretation to the usual Ramsey rule, except
now the effects on X1 and X2 are combined.
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